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Abstract 
Process facilities are well known for unplanned chemical emission, toxic release, 
fire and explosion and operational disruption. These incidents have the potential to cause 
an industrial accident and environmental damage. From the investigation of all major 
accidents, it is apparent that most industrial accidents can be avoided or restricted with a 
systematic risk analysis and safety management strategy. An effective risk analysis 
strategy always gives preference to minimizing the risk of a process facility at its design 
stages. 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured and logical 
method for identifying and assessing risks of complex process systems. It uses fault tree 
analysis (FT A) as a tool to identify basic causes leading to an undesired event, to 
represent logical dependency of these basic causes in leading to the event, and finally to 
calculate the probability of occurrence of this event. Probability data estimation, and 
large and complex fault trees, are challenging aspects of FT A as applied to process 
facilities. 
Quantitative analysis of a fault tree for a process system requires a fault tree and the 
system components (basic events) failure data. Sometimes or always it is difficult to have 
an exact estimation of the failure rate of individual components or the probability of 
occurrence of undesired events due to a lack of sufficient data. Further, due to 
ii 
imprecision in basic failure data or the data sufficiency the overall analysis of a fault tree 
may be questionable. To avoid such conditions, a fuzzy approach may be used with the 
FTA technique. This reduces the ambiguity and imprecision arising out of the 
subjectivity of the data. 
Fault tree construction for a process facility must accommodate for a wide variation 
m components, process operations and control mechanisms. It is more scientific to 
analyze such a large and complex fault tree through proper sub-divisions of the tree. A 
proper modularization technique (sub-division) can sub divide a tree into its equivalent 
sub trees and then analyze it for the process facility. 
This work is focused on developing a methodology of a fuzzy based computer-
aided fault tree analysis tool. The central idea of this methodology is to adopt a suitable 
algorithm for moduling (sub-dividing) a large and complex fault tree and then evaluate it 
by using the fuzzy approach. This methodology uses a systematic approach of fault tree 
development, fault tree modularization, minimal cut sets determination, fuzzy probability 
analysis, and fuzzy based sensitivity analysis of a system for achieving its objectives. 
Besides developing a methodology for computer- aided FT A, this study also proposes a 
procedure of fuzzy approach for the uncertainty analysis, which is used for comparing 
error robustness of fuzzy FT A and conventional FT A. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RISK ANALYSIS FOR PROCESS FACILITY 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In general, risk associated with an event can be defined as the probability of 
environmental damage, economic loss or human injury, in terms of both the incident's 
likelihood and the magnitude of the injury, damage, or loss. 
CPQRA (Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis) defines risk as a function of 
probability or frequency of a particular accident scenario, as well as its consequences 
(AIChE, 2000). 
Risk= F (s, c, f) 
Where s = hypothetical scenario, c = estimated consequence(s), and f = estimated 
frequency. 
According to Kaplan and Garrick (Kaplan, et. al., 1981), risk of a process system is a set 
of scenarios, each of which has a probability and a consequence. 
Risk analysis is a systematic approach, which gathers and integrates all the 
information about scenarios, frequencies, and consequences of an activity. This is an 
important part of the risk assessment process that identifies the basic causes that can lead 
to an accident by developing casual relations between the scenarios, frequencies and 
consequences of a risk. This casual relation of a risk assessment model acquires all 
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information about a system and gives an overview of the decision making process for 
reducing the probability of an accident and improving the system design of the risk 
management process (Ljungquist, 2003). The risk analysis or risk assessment for a 
process facility or system is done by the chronological steps shown in Figure 1.1. 
Hazard 
Identifications f-
I Qualitative Evaluation • Quantitative Evaluation 
r-----------~--------------~ 
I I 
_Lo..
1 
L!__... Likelihoods 1 
,-----,----.. Model Causes ~ , 
1 1 Estimation 1 
I • I 
: FrequencyiAnalysis : 
------------~--------------' I 
r-----------~--------------~ 
: ConsequenceiAnalysis : 
I • I 
I I I 
L{-. ~ Impacts 1 Model Effects 
1 I Estimation 1 
I " I 
------------~--------------' 
Risk 
Evaluations 
• Undesired event risk 
estimation 
• Basic cause's 
contribution estimation 
• Modifications with 
respect to design limit 
Figure 1.1: Risk assessment methodology for process facility 
1.2. SIGNIFICANCE OF RISK ANALYSIS 
System safety and reliability are the main parameters to ensure system design, 
development, and operation for a process facility. It is generally preferred to use risk 
analysis process for estimating the risk measuring parameters of a process or operation 
system. These quantitative or qualitative risk parameters enhance the decision task for 
reducing the different types of major or minor risk incidents probabilities occurring in a 
process facility or offshore operation system. A study by HSE (1996) and Mansfield et al. 
(1996a) described that around 80% of industrial accidents have occurred from major or 
minor risk incidents in a process operation system. The potential sources of these 
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incidents include riser or process leaks, fires, explosions, pipeline ruptures, vessel 
ruptures, chemical releases and design faults of a system (Pula, 2005). Some Examples of 
industrial accidents that have occurred in the last few decades include the Flixborough, 
England accident, which cost the lives of 28 people, the whole plant and many injuries 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2002); the Bhopal, India accident, which killed more than 2000 
civilians and injured 20,000 more (Crowl & Louvar, 2002); a massive explosion in 
Pasadena, Texas on Oct. 23, 1989, which resulted in 23 fatalities, 314 injuries, and capital 
loss of over $715 million (Lees, 1996). Recently on March 23, 2005, the Isomerization 
unit explosions of British Petroleum (Mogford, 2005), Texas City, killed 15 people and 
injured over 170 more persons. The investigation team revealed that an improper level 
indicator design of Raffinate Splitter was one of the main contributors to this accident. 
The study of previous industrial accidents shows that most of these accidents occurred 
due to improper identifications of risk incidents and correlations of these incidents with 
an accident. However, the major accidents mentioned above occur rarely in process 
operations, but minor incidents are very common in process facilities, occurring on a day-
to-day basis, resulting in many occupational injuries, illnesses, and costing society 
billions of dollars every year. The investigation of all the major or minor accidents 
discloses that an effective risk analysis and safety management strategy can easily restrict 
them. 
The world is more conscious for developing a systematic methodology for 
estimating both financial, safety, and environmental risks of an industry. The ultimate 
goal of this risk management plan is to control the risk incidents as well as the major or 
3 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
minor accidents that occur in process facilities on a routine basis. In 2000, the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) developed guidelines for quantitative risk 
analysis strategy for the chemical process industry. Now, all developed countries 
maintain a specific guideline for industrial safety to maintain a desired risk level for the 
process facility. Crowl et al. (2002) mentioned that more than 50 federal regulations of a 
developed country are dedicated, or directly related, to process safety. A few safety 
management organizations such as Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), Process Safety Management (PSM), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and Risk Management Program (RMP) have generally worked to interpret the industrial 
risk into the SIL (Safety Integrated Level) for federal or state regulations. 
1.3 RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative and quantitative risk analysis are the two types of risk evaluation system 
that are used in process facilities or any operation system for estimating risk in terms of 
different risk parameters, i.e., societal risk, individual risk, potential loss of life, 
probability of an accident, and reliability of a system. Qualitative analysis, performed at 
each stage of system development, is intended to identify all major hazards with their 
relevant causes. Most of the traditional qualitative analysis methods, e.g. HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operability Study), Functional Hazard Analysis, and Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis, are descriptive and generally used for identifying possible system 
hazards. Normally these methods are used in preparation for consequence analysis or 
failure frequency analysis modeling of a risk analysis process, and also when a more 
detailed study is not required (Hauptmanns, 1988; Lees, 1996). After identifying the 
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possible hazard scenarios of a system, the principal task of risk analysis is to find the 
logical causes and consequences for the identified hazard scenarios. Quantitative analysis 
is usually applied to this major task for a risk analysis process. 
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) for a process system can either be deterministic 
or probabilistic. Generally, the deterministic methods focus on consequence assessment 
(such as worst-case scenario analysis), while the probabilistic approaches consider both 
frequency and consequence. The probabilistic approach of QRA evaluates risk for a 
system in terms of its numerical evaluation of consequences and frequencies of an 
accident or an incident. Probabilistic data and information about the possible hazard 
scenarios of an accident are the main required parameters of probabilistic QRA. The final 
outcome of QRA involves a numerical evaluation of all system hazards and their 
contributions to the overall risk. Therefore, QRA is more aptly defined as a systematic 
analysis strategy, rather than a well-defined methodology. The main objectives of QRA 
are to find the answers to question like "How often will it happen?", "How can this 
happen?" or "What are the consequences of an accident?". 
The first step of QRA is hazard identification. The identified hazards are needed for 
further evaluation to find the answers of "how often it will happen?" and "How can this 
happen?" These types of queries for a system are addressed by quantitative evaluation. 
QRA finds these answers via developing frequency model among the incidents of an 
accident and calculating the probability of each incident scenario for a system. Fault tree 
analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA), and Markov Modeling are usually used in risk 
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analysis process for developing the frequency model. ETA is used to estimate the 
distributions of incident outcomes (e.g., frequencies of explosions, pool fires, flash fires, 
and safe dispersal) while Ff A is used to estimate incident frequency (e.g., major leakage 
of a flammable material). Markov modeling involves large quantities of fundamental 
mathematics and is generally preferred for dynamic systems where time dependent 
failure must be considered. The focus of the present work is to develop a systematic 
methodology of Ff A for the risk analysis process. 
1.4 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis (FfA) was first developed in 1961-1962 by H. A. Watson at Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, in connection with a US Air Force contract to study the 
Minuteman Missile launch control system. The first published paper was presented at the 
1965 Safety Symposium sponsored by the University of Washington and the Boeing 
Company. In this paper, D. F. Haas!, R.J. Schroder, and W.R. Jackson described the 
whole technique of fault tree construction and its application to a wide variety of 
industrial safety and reliability problem techniques. Since 1965, fault tree analysis has 
proliferated its applications in every sector, especially where safety and risk management 
of a system is a major issue. 
1.4.1 FUNDAMENTALS OF FTA 
A complete Ff A has two major parts: one is fault tree development, which 
represents an accident model, and the other part is the evaluation of an accident. 
Therefore, a FfA can be defined as a systematic and deductive technique, which allows 
6 
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for identifying the basic causes of an undesired event, and finally gives a complete 
analysis for the evaluation of the causes and the undesired event for an accident. It is a 
deductive tool in the sense that it starts from a defined system failure event, and unfolds 
its causes backward down to the primary (basic) independent faults. The qualitative 
analysis of a fault tree identifies all possible paths that lead to an undesired event for a 
system, while quantitative analysis of a fault tree helps to estimate the probability of a 
eventual event from the given failure probabilities of the system's components and basic 
causes (Veseley et al., 1981; Lees 1996; AIChE, 2000). Besides the graphical 
representations, a complete analysis of a FfA, which is either a qualitative or quantitative 
evaluation, ensures the following information for the process facility: 
• Identifying safety critical components 
• Verifying product requirements 
• Certifying product reliabilities 
• Assessing product risks 
• Investigating accidents/incidents 
• Evaluating design changes 
• Displaying the causes and consequences of events 
• Identifying common-cause failures 
1.4.2 SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF FTA 
• Event: Any unwanted or unexpected situations i.e., abnormal or deviation from 
expected state of a system or a component is known as an event in Ff A. As an 
example as ethylene release from a tank, explosions, carbon filter system failure 
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can be treated as analyzing event for the process facility as well offshore 
operations system. 
• Top event: The unwanted event or incident that is analyzed to further for finding 
the basic cause of an incident or an accident. It places at the top of the fault tree 
and is traced downward to more basic failures using logic gates. 
• Basic Event: An event that no further development or definition is judged 
necessary (e.g., equipment item failure, human failure, external event). 
• Undeveloped Event: A basic event that cannot be further developed, because of 
unavailable information or historical data insufficiency. 
• Logic gate: The gates that are used to express the logical relationships between 
inputs (lower) events and a single output (Higher event). In most cases, a fault 
tree uses the AND or OR logic gates to represent the whole logical dependency of 
higher event and lower events. AND gates combine the input events, all of which 
have to occur simultaneously for the output event to occur. In the case of OR 
gates, the output event occurs if at least one of the input events occurs. 
• Intermediate Event: An event that is a combination of a few more basic events 
or any gate event. It propagates towards on an initiating (basic) event during the 
accident sequence (e.g., improper operating action, failure to stop an ammonia 
leak, but an emergency plan mitigates the consequences). 
• Likelihood: A quantitative measure of the expected occurrence of an event. This 
may be expressed as a frequency (e.g., events/year), a probability of occurrence 
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during some time interval, or a conditional probability (e.g., probability of 
occurrence given that a precursor event has occurred). 
• Boolean algebra: Boolean algebra describes the behavior of linear functions of 
all variables that are binary in nature: fails or working state, on or off, open or 
closed, true or false. All coherent fault trees can be converted into an equivalent 
set of Boolean equations. 
• Minimal cutset (MCSs): Minimal cutsets are basically a combination of basic 
events and show the shortest pathway to an undesired top event (i.e., the 
pathway(s) involving the least number of basic events). The final outcome, failure 
modes and system weak points are obtained from properly assessing all minimal 
cutsets of a fault tree. 
• Fault tree modularization: Division of a large fault tree into some small trees is 
known as fault tree modularization. It accelerates the computational time of fault 
tree analysis. 
• Boolean Matrix Transformation: A Boolean matrix represents whole 
connections between the gate events and basic events of a fault tree. 
• Probability: Probability is a numerical measure for the degree of certainty (or 
degree of uncertainty) of the occurrence of an event. It summarizes how likely an 
event will occur by estimating the ratio of an event outcome to the number of all 
possible event outcomes. The outcome of the forecast (or likelihood of an event 
occurring) is expressed as a number between zero (certain not to occur) and one 
(certain to occur). 
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• Fuzzy Probability: In conventional probability analysis the probability value of 
an event is considered as a crisp value for the analysis. Fuzzy probability 
considers an event probability value as a fuzzy number, which is fuzzified on the 
basis of considered uncertainties with the event probability value. 
1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Ff A is an effective and valuable design tool to improve a system safety of a process 
facility or an operation system. Regrettably, the use of FfA is comparatively limited in 
the process industry. The two major barriers that restrict the use of FfA for process 
safety analysis are as follows: 
1. The first obstacle is solving a large and complex fault tree for an operation 
system. Normally the processes, materials, equipment, and control mechanisms of 
the process facility or operations system are varied according to the industry and 
its objectives. Due to these subjective factors, fault tree construction faces much 
more diversification in the process industries than in the nuclear industry (Wang, 
2004). Subsequently, in most cases the fault trees for the process industry become 
comparatively large and complex, and are difficult to analyze without moduling. 
ii. The second important barrier for FfA is event data precision. The quantitative 
analysis of a fault tree needs a fault tree along with failure data of the basic events 
(components). Sometimes it is difficult to have precise estimation of the failure 
rate of individual components, or the probability of occurrence of undesired 
events due to a lack of sufficient data. Further, due to imprecision in basic data 
and the uncertainty of conventional Ff A, the overall result may be questionable. 
10 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
A suitable modularization algorithm and fuzzy set theory applied to computer-aided 
Ff A may simplify the complex network of a fault tree, and also reduce the ambiguity or 
vagueness of the outcomes of a fault tree, respectively. These two approaches 
(modularization and fuzzy set theory) would greatly encourage the use of Ff A in the 
process industry, as well as in any operation system. 
1.6 OBJECTIVES OF PRESENT WORK 
The preceding discussion indicates that Ff A is an important tool for a 
comprehensive risk management study. Coping with large fault trees and imprecise event 
data are now the main barriers to its applications in the process facility or any operation 
system. To overcome this difficulty, a methodology for computer-aided Ff A has been 
developed in this research. Then, an uncertainty analysis is used to compare the error 
robustness of the fuzzy probability approach, along with the conventional probability 
approach. 
The objectives of this research include: 
• To develop a revised methodology for computer-aided fault tree analysis by 
incorporating: 
• fault tree modularization algorithm to module a large and complex 
fault tree (to save computational time). 
• fuzzy probability theory and its use in performing probabilistic risk 
assessment (quantitative fault tree analysis). 
• To analyze and compare system sensitivity and the error robustness of the fuzzy 
probability approach, along with the conventional probability approach. 
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1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS WORK 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter gives a broad overview 
of risk analysis methodology and its significance and current practices in the process 
industry. Further, it describes the FT A technique with some basics and the difficulties of 
its application in process facilities are discussed, followed by the objectives of this work. 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed study of the FTA technique for a process facility. 
Particularly, FTA steps for computer-aided fault tree analysis are emphasized and the 
procedures for developing a complete methodology for computer aided FT A have been 
discussed. Chapter 3 provides the rules and symbols used for fault tree development for 
any process facility. This chapter also includes an illustrative example for fault tree 
development that is used in the methodology proposed in this study. Chapter 4 discusses 
the fault tree evaluation techniques used in the present methodology. This chapter 
elaborates the extensive literature review carried out in fault tree evaluation modeling to 
select a suitable model for qualitative and quantitative analysis for computer-aided FTA. 
Modeling details of the selected model are discussed in detail with an illustrative example 
as well. 
With successful selection of essential and appropriate models for a process facility 
as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, computer codes were developed in Visual Basic for 
fault tree development and Excel simulations were run for the evaluation of the 
developed fault tree. This is discussed with a case study in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses 
the simulation results obtained using the proposed methodology for the case study. 
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Further, the results are also compared and validated with the results obtained from some 
other commercial packages. Chapter 7 includes the final conclusions of this work and 
future scope of research in this area. 
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Chapter2 
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPUTER-AIDED FTA 
This Chapter provides an overview of the fault trees analysis (Ff A) technique for a 
process facility. Different available methodologies for FTA are reviewed and finally a 
stepwise methodology for FT A is developed in this study. The procedure to develop a 
computer-aided FTA is illustrated and models required to carry out the fault tree analysis 
are identified and discussed here. 
2.1 FTA FOR PROCESS FACILITY 
As per the discussion in the previous chapter, risk analysis involves four main basic 
steps: hazard identification, frequency analysis, consequence analysis, and finally risk 
evaluation. Hazard identification identifies system hazards. Risk evaluation measures the 
system risk that arises from the identified hazard. Frequency and consequence model of 
risk analysis are the two central steps of risk analysis for estimating the qualitative and 
quantitative risk for a system in terms of human injury, environmental damage, economic 
loss, the incident likelihood, operational damage or loss, system reliability, as well as 
system lifetime and safety (Ljungquist, 2003). Risk analysis of a process system uses the 
FT A approach to model the frequency of the identified process hazards and then 
evaluates the system risk for the process facility. The evaluation strategy of FT A involves 
identification of initiating events which may eventually lead to a major accident, shortest 
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routes (a senes of initiating events) that lead to an accident, the probabilities of 
occurrence of such initiating events, the relative contribution of each of the initiating 
events, and finally, a means to sort out these initiating events with the greatest potential 
to cause the major accident (Khan and Abassi, 1999). FfA is now widely used as an 
effective tool to assess the system performance, reliability and safety of various complex 
systems as in a nuclear reactor, in aerospace, in the petrochemical industry, the process 
industry, and in the offshore oil and gas operations system. Nevertheless, the steps and 
methods for a complete Ff A remains the same for all types of process facilities and other 
systems. Only the specific fault tree developed for a process unit or system that is used in 
the analysis varies from system to system and process to process. 
HSE (1996) and Mansfield et al. (1996) previously found that among all industrial 
accidents, process accident pose the highest risk to both humans and the industry itself. 
Accidents in the process facilities can include large quantity of explosive chemical 
emission, toxic release, and fire or explosion, all potentially resulting from abnormal 
developments in the course of an industrial activity. Theses accidents may cause a serious 
danger to the workers, the public or the environment. A successful risk reduction method, 
i.e., inherent safety which gives emphasis on minimizing risk at design stages of a 
process plant, can minimize the system risk from its basic design. Generally, a typical 
FfA methodology involves several steps, which require experts' time, reliable 
probability data, and computational capabilities. Haasl (1965), McCormick (1981), 
Roberts et al. (1981), Hauptmanns (1988), Henley and Kumamoto (1981), Billington and 
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Allen (1986), Lees (1996), Khan and Abbasi (1999) and AIChE (2000) described the 
following basic steps for developing a methodology for computer-aided FT A: 
1. Knowledge accumulation about the process system and process operation 
using a process block diagram. 
2. Identification of system hazards or undesired top event by analyzing the 
hazard scenarios for a process. 
3. Fault tree construction for a process facility. 
4. Estimating or collecting the failure probability data for all basic components 
or basic events. 
5. Qualitative and quantitative evaluation of a developed fault tree. 
6. Perform sensitivity analysis of a fault tree. 
7. Re-evaluate the fault tree for the corresponding changes. 
To optimize these time-consuming steps for analyzing a fault tree of a system or 
process unit, many computerized FT A tools have been developed, including CARA fault 
tree, PROFAT, Relex Fault Tree, and Fault tree+. The basic rules for a fault tree 
development of a system are more or less same for all FTA tools. The difference is only 
in their evaluation strategy of the fault tree. Figure 2.1 shows the basic steps that are 
generally used for computer-aided FT A. The following sections of this chapter analyze 
the methodologies that have been used in the available FT A tools. 
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FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
Develop failure logic 
Use "AND" and "OR" gates 
Proceed down to basic event 
STEP4 
QUALITATIVE EV ALUTION 
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Figure 2.1: Operational steps for Ff A (AIChE, 2000) 
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2.2 OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE FTA TOOLS 
The first computer based FfA technique was developed in the early 1970's 
(Henley, 1981). Since then, the use of computer-aided FfA has become an effective tool 
for in any type of process facility to assess their operational performance and system 
safety. Automated fault tree generation develops a fault tree for a specific process system 
on the basis of several techniques, e.g. Diagraph Based Methods (Lapp and Powers, 1977 
and 1979), fault tree construction by formal method (Fussell, 1973), Rule Based Methods 
(Elliott, 1994), and Loop Based Methods (Shafaghi, 1988). 
In process industries or facilities, there exist diversification in between process 
operations as well as within the process components. In addition, the process output and 
material production also varies from process to process. These process phenomena make 
variations in fault tree constructions for a process facility. During the last two decades, 
many researchers and organizations have been working on computerized fault tree 
analysis tools, which contain the flexibility to develop a fault tree for diversified systems. 
A variety of methods and tools have been developed for this purpose. Figure 2.2 shows a 
general algorithm for developing computer-aided Ff A tools. The features of four 
available commercial tools for Ff A are described below. 
CARA-Fault Tree: CARA-Fault Tree (CARA-Fault Tree, version 4.1, 1999) is a 
Microsoft Windows based program for top-down construction of fault trees. The fault 
tree is constructed from top to bottom using symbols for each event. To minimize 
computing time and to provide convenient analysis, this FfA tool follows a 
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modularization technique consisting of scanning the fault tree for so-called super-
modules or sub-trees with input events that are not repeated inside or outside the sub-tree. 
In the modularized tree, the modules are treated as input events and the corresponding 
probabilities are re-computed for each module by a simple recursive (exact) technique. It 
should be noted that if the modularization option is chosen, the MOCUS (minimum 
obtained cutsets) algorithm implemented in the CARA-Fault Tree will produce minimal 
cutsets only in terms of the input events of the modularized tree; i.e. the modules 
themselves will appear as input events in the minimal cutsets. 
Fault Tree+: Fault Tree+, developed by Isograph Ltd., runs under Microsoft Windows 
and is capable of analyzing large and complex fault and event trees producing the full 
minimal cutsets representation for fault tree top events and event tree consequences. It 
follows a minimal cutsets generation algorithm to analyze large and complex fault and 
event trees events (Fault Tree+, Version 11.0, Demo). 
Relex Fault Tree: Relex Fault Tree provides a flexible user interface that allows the user 
to create a fault tree on a window. It uses the idea of modeling a whole tree in terms of a 
series of smaller fault trees for coping with the large fault tree. An analytical approach is 
used in this tool to calculate and display the probabilities of the events and gates at a 
given period of time. 
PROFAT: The package PROFAT (PRObabilistic FAult Tree analysis) (Khan and 
Abbasi, 1999) is based on an analytical simulation methodology. This package reduces 
the imprecision and ambiguity in fault tree by incorporating probability analysis with 
fuzzy sets. Although this package has the capability to analyze large and complex trees 
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by using a modularization technique, it has no graphical interface by which a user can 
draw the whole fault tree on a window. 
Draw the desired fault tree using 
GUI 
Do connections checking of each 
gate event and basic event 
NO 
Determine minimal cutsets 
Probability analysis 
Sensitivity analysis 
• Basic event importance 
• Cutsets Importance 
Figure 2.2: Algorithm of Ff A tool 
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Except PROFAT, the remaining FTA tools use the conventional probability 
approach for the quantitative evaluation of a fault tree. The conventional FT A method 
considers failure probability data of basic events to be crisp for calculating top event 
probability. In fact, in real situations the event data cannot be exact values. A great deal 
of uncertainty is generally associated along with these event's data (Sawyer, 1994; 
Guimarees et al., 1999; Wu, 2004). Moreover, the accuracy of FTA prediction for a 
system depends on the precision of the basic component data. In order to reduce the 
ambiguity and data vagueness, PROF AT uses fuzzy concepts in precising the basic event 
data. However, PROFAT gives a fuzzy based analysis of a fault tree. It faces some 
problems on basic event data fuzzification and top event probability calculation. Also, it 
has no GUI for drawing a fault tree and making a connection list of the tree for FT A. This 
study addressed these limitations of PROF AT by revising its fuzzy model and 
methodology for probability analysis. The following sections emphasize a complete 
methodology for computer-aided FT A. 
2.3 PROCEDURE FOR DEVELOPING FTA METHODOLOGY 
Based on the above discussion, it is apparent that the steps involved for FT A 
methodology are fault tree development, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis and 
sensitivity analysis. All of these steps are time-consuming, and involve a few 
brainstorming calculations and are prone to errors-of-omission and inaccuracies. The 
main objective of a computer- aided FT A tool is to perform an appropriate analysis of a 
fault (top event) and the causes of this fault. Further, it can optimize the time-consuming 
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task, and minimize the error of fault tree analysis for a system or process unit. The 
complete architecture of the proposed methodology of Ff A for this study is shown in 
Figure 2.3 and a brief discussion of each step is given below. 
i. Fault tree development: This step of the Ff A builds a graphical model of all 
identified hazard scenarios for a process system. Fault tree construction for a 
system including preparing a connection list of the whole tree is very significant. 
Details concerning rules and symbols used for the fault tree development are 
elaborated in Chapter 3. 
11. Qualitative analysis: A failure or an undesired event occurs as a result of single 
cause or combination of two or three causes. Qualitative analysis can give a 
prediction about process system failure characteristics via sorting out the failure 
modes, i.e., minimal cutsets (MCSs) for a system. The qualitative evaluation for 
this study is carried out in two steps. The first step identifies the modules of a 
large fault tree and the second step translates these identified modules into a 
Boolean matrix to determine the MCSs of a tree. Available algorithms for fault 
tree modularization and MCSs determination have been reviewed and the most 
suitable method is identified for large and complex fault trees. Section 4.1 gives 
the details of qualitative analysis of Ff A. 
iii. Quantitative analysis: Quantitative analysis evaluates a system numerically. It 
generally uses probability analysis approach to calculate the probability of an 
undesired event for a Ff A. In order to overcome the vague evaluation of 
conventional FfA, a fuzzy based probability analysis approach is incorporated in 
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quantitative evaluation of this methodology. A comprehensive literature review 
has been carried out to develop a fuzzy model for the probability analysis of Ff A. 
Stepwise descriptions for the fuzzy based quantitative evaluation of Ff A are 
presented in sections 4.2.1, and 4.2.2. 
iv. Sensitivity analysis: Sensitivity analysis gives a numerical evaluation for the 
necessary design modifications, and the weakest link detection of a process 
system. It can also calculate the quantitative contribution of each cause that leads 
to an undesired event for the system. A fuzzy weighted index (FWI) and the 
cutsets importance are used in this study for performing the sensitivity analysis of 
the system. The details of these two steps are described in section 4.2.3. 
However, a few computer tools for Ff A are available. Most of these tools use a 
traditional approach for the probability analysis of a developed fault tree. As previously 
discussed, basic events data are the input parameter for the quantitative analysis. Events 
data collection and estimation is now the main barrier for traditional Ff A. The aim of this 
work is to develop a methodology for a computer-aided FfA tool that would overcomes 
the limitations of basic events data estimation in probability analysis (quantitative 
analysis) of a fault tree, and the problems associated with handling the large and complex 
tree for MCSs determination of a tree. Fuzzy set theory and modular approach with 
Boolean matrix transformation are used in this methodology to recover the limitations of 
traditional Ff A. Special features of this methodology are highlighted in the next section 
of this chapter. 
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Figure 2.3: Architecture of proposed methodology for fuzzy based FT A tool 
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2.4 FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The revised methodology developed for FT A has the following features: 
1. Identifies all possible cutsets through the detected modules of a large fault tree. 
11. Estimates basic events data through the fuzzy set approach. 
111. Calculate the probability of an undesired event through fuzzy probability analysis. 
iv. Determine the contribution of each basic cause and MCSs for an undesired event 
through the numerical estimation of FWI and cutsets importance. 
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Chapter 3 
FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT 
Fault tree analysis (Ff A) starts with the specified undesired state of a system 
(usually known as top event/undesired event e.g., hazardous event, equipment failure) 
and then the tree is developed from the top-down to find the all credible ways in which 
the undesired event can occur. All identified credible ways or basic causes are interlinked 
with each other by Boolean logic gates (AND gate or OR gate). Therefore a fault tree 
itself is a graphical model of various parallel and sequential combinations of faults that 
will result in the occurrence of a predefined undesired event. The faults commonly 
known as basic events of a fault tree can be component failures, human error, 
environmental conditions, design error, improper device control and so on. Simply, a 
fault tree depicts a logical relationship between the top event and basic events. The 
following sections of this chapter depict the necessary symbols and rules for fault tree 
development. 
3.1 BASIC ELElVIENTS AND SYMBOLS USED IN FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
Two types of symbol generally preferred for tree development are: (1) event 
symbols; and (2) logic gate symbols. Event symbols are used for representing a top event, 
basic events, undeveloped events, external events, and intermediate events. Logic gate 
symbols are used for demonstrating AND or OR gates of a fault tree. The commonly used 
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event and gate symbols for composing a fault tree are primarily collected from 
McCormick (1981), Kumamoto and Henley (1981), Veseley et al. (1981) AIChE (2000), 
Lees (1996) and these are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
Table 3.1: Fault tree event symbols 
Graphical Symbol Shape Name Representing Event 
I". J Rectangle It is used for representing Intermediate event or 
top-event. 
() Circle Represents the basic event 
0 Diamond Undeveloped Event 
0 Oval Conditional event-use for representing any 
conditions 
0 House External Events 
Table 3.2: Fault tree gate symbols 
Graphical Symbol Shape Name Representing logic 
0 AND gate AND gates combine the input events, all of which 
has to occur simultaneously for the output event to 
occur. 
u OR gate OR gates combine the output event that occurs if at 
least one of the input events occurs. 
0 INHABIT Input event produces output event when conditional gate 
event occurs. 
D TRANSFER Transferring gate information or event information gate 
under a sub tree. 
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The structural diagram for constructing a fault tree described by Henley et al. 
(1981) is demonstrated in Figure 3.1. According to this figure, the undesired event or 
incident, which needs further analysis, is positioned on the top of a fault tree. For 
example, the most typical top events for a process facility are toxic or flammable gas or 
liquid release, fire, explosions, component ruptures or malfunctions. The basic causes are 
those responsible for the top event and represented as basic events. A basic event is 
placed on a tree when it does not require further analysis. The intermediate events are the 
combinations of basic events or gate events. They appear on the tree when two or three 
basic events or gate events need to be represented by only one event. Transfer gates show 
the continuation of a large fault tree to the corresponding tree divisions. An event with 
unavailable information is generally symbolized as an undeveloped event in a fault tree. 
Using the denoted events and gate symbols the graphical model of a fault tree is finally 
built up for a process facility. This model shows a connection among the top event and 
basic events along with intermediate, external, or undeveloped events. Each connection 
of this tree expresses the logical dependency of an event with any other events. In most 
cases, fault tree construction uses AND or OR gate events to express the dependency of 
the top event with the basic/other events. Figure 3.2 shows a fault tree developed using 
the standard symbols. 
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0 
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Figure 3.1: Fundamental structural diagram of fault tree (Henley et al., 1981) 
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14---- Top-event 
Intermediate event 
\ Undevelopod event 
~----AND gate 
Basic event 
Figure 3.2: Standard fault tree symbols 
3.2 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
AIChE (2000) depicts the three approaches for a fault tree construction: 1) manual 
fault tree development; 2) algorithmic fault tree development; and 3) automatic fault tree 
development. An algorithmic fault tree develops a fault tree for a process system on the 
basis of several techniques, e.g. Diagraph Based Methods (Lapp and Powers, 1977 and 
1979), Fault Tree construction (Fussell, 1973), Rule Based Methods (Elliott, 1994), and 
Loop Based Methods (Shafaghi, 1988). For automatic fault tree development, Salem et al 
(1981) developed CAT code, Taylor (1982) developed RIKKE code and Martin-Soils et 
al. (1980) developed the fault propagation code. Algorithmic or automatic fault tree 
construction is only able to construct a fault tree for a specific system. The variation of 
process components and process operation allows a wide variation in the fault tree 
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construction for a process unit. Further, the operation of these components is not unique 
for all process facilities, or industries. It is varied according to the goal and the process 
output of a facility/industry. Because of these variations in components and operation 
systems, neither algorithmic nor automatic fault tree construction can build the actual 
fault tree for the process system. For these reasons, automatic fault tree constructing has 
not been widely preferred in fault tree analysis at yet. 
Manual fault tree construction has user flexibility to construct a fault tree and gives 
more emphasis to user ideas for developing a fault tree. CARA fault tree, Relex fault tree, 
Fault tree+ all of these fault tree tools have a graphical user interface for constructing a 
fault tree by drag and drop event symbols or gate symbols from a toolbar menu. Fault tree 
construction for a process facility follows some specific rules and regulations. Henley et 
al. (1981), Veseley et al. (1981), AIChE (2000), Lees (1996), Khan and Abbasi (1999) 
and Wang (2004) have described the rules for fault tree development. 
3.2.1. RULES FOR FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
A fault tree demonstrates the causal relationship among basic failures (basic events) 
that contribute to a predetermined system failure (top event). To complete the 
construction of a fault tree manually for a complicated system, it is important to first 
understand how the process works. Process description gives an overall idea about the 
process and component behavior, as well as the logical dependency of each component of 
a system. On the other hand, failure scenarios (hazard identification) help to sort out the 
undesired event and the top event of a fault tree. Many methods could be used for 
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studying failure scenarios of a system, such as preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), hazard 
and operability (HAZOP) studies and failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) (AIChE, 
2000). Once failure scenarios are identified, the fault tree is developed in the form of a 
logical diagram for the system. The causal relationship among the basic events and top 
event is expressed using a logic symbol such as an AND-gate or an OR-gate. In the case 
of large fault tree constructions for process systems each logic gate and basic event has a 
unique identifier. Generally the logic gates are labeled with G 1, G2, G3, and so on. Each 
basic event or undeveloped event is labeled with BEl, BE2, BE3, and so on. While a 
fault tree construction is inherently subjective, it nevertheless some specific guidelines 
for constructing a high-quality fault tree model of a process system. US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commissions (1981) examined and listed the guidelines for fault tree 
development in the Fault Tree Handbook. They have subdivided the guidelines as ground 
rules and fault propagation rules, which are highlighted below. 
• Ground Rule 1 
Write accurately in event statement boxes about what the fault is and when it 
occurs. Try to use simple words and avoid the word that might lead to 
ambiguous meaning. 
• Ground Rule 2 
Classify the fault events accurately. If a specific fault consists with a 
component failure; classify it as a "state-of-component fault". Otherwise, 
classify it as a "state-of-system fault". 
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• Fault Propagation Rule 1 (No Miracles Rule) 
If the normal functioning of a component propagates a fault sequence, then it 
is assumed that the component functions normally. 
• Fault Propagation Rule 2 (Complete-the-Gate Rule) 
All inputs to a particular intermediate gate should be completely defined 
before further analysis of any one of them is undertaken. 
• Fault Propagation Rule 3 (No Gate-to-Gate Rule) 
All gate inputs should be properly defined, and no gate should directly feed 
into another gate. 
The more accurate fault tree model gives a more conservative analysis for a system. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of fault tree construction fully depends on user ideas and 
expert inputs. Manual fault tree construction has the option to update the user idea and 
inputs at any time. 
This study builds a GUI (Graphical User Interface) to develop a fault tree which has 
the facility to modify the tree construction by users. The rules and elements for the fault 
tree development described in this chapter have been used to generate the computer code 
for the GUI. The following section of this chapter shows an illustrative example of fault 
tree construction using the rules and elements of fault tree development. 
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3.3 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF A FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION 
This process is adapted from AIChE (2000), which deals with a control unit of a 
reactor operation system. Proper card signals from temperature elements (TE) and 
pressure transmitters (PT) control the shutdown period of the reactor unit. The identified 
hazard for the system is loss of capability to shut down the reactor system. The process 
diagram is shown in Figure 3.3 
1 Input Card 1 
!---------~ 
...-------+--+---------~ I 
Reactor 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I ;~~~~~~~~---()~-~d 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
-------}--------~ Shutdownr"\ 
L---------+---+-• Input Card 2 Signal Q 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 3.3: Process block diagram of illustrative example (AIChE, 2000) 
The fault tree is constructed for this system based on the fault tree construction 
rules. Respective logic gates are used to express the logical dependency of possible 
failure modes for the system. In total seven basic causes were identified that lead to loss 
of capability of system shutdown. According to the rule all basic events are labeled with 
BEl, BE2, BE3, BE4, BE5, BE6 and BE7 respectively. A total of six logic gates are 
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labeled with 01, 02, 03, 04, 05 and 06. The developed fault tree for loss of capability 
to shutdown the reactor system is shown in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4: Fault tree diagram of illustrative example 
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Chapter4 
FAULT TREE EVALUATION 
This chapter describes the fault tree evaluation techniques for process facility. Once 
a fault tree is constructed for a process system it needs qualitative or quantitative 
evaluations for predicting the system's reliability and safety (Veseley, 1981; AIChE, 
2000). A fault tree that consists of a few gates and basic events can be easily evaluated 
manually. However, large and complex fault trees for a process facility need a computer 
code and a systematic algorithm for a complete evaluation. This chapter discusses the 
qualitative and quantitative evaluation technique of the proposed methodology for a fault 
tree. 
4.1 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
When a fault tree has been constructed for a process system the qualitative 
evaluation can be performed by using the structure of the tree and Boolean algebra 
operations. Boolean expressions in qualitative analysis have been carried out to express a 
tree as a combination of basic failure modes of a system that are sufficient to cause an 
undesired top event to occur. These expressions are sufficient enough to model the failure 
mechanism of a system, possible failure modes, and identification of critical events for a 
system. The reliability and safety analysis of a system utilizes the information of 
qualitative analysis for improving the system design and modifications. According to 
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Veseley (1981), AIChE (2000), Henley et al. (1981) the qualitative evaluation of a fault 
tree includes: i) the minimal cutsets (MCSs) determination, ii) qualitative basic events 
importance estimation, and iii) common-cause failures detection. As previously 
mentioned, MCSs are basically combinations of basic events that shows the shortest 
pathway to an undesired top event. Qualitative importance provides a relative ranking of 
all basic events as per their contribution to system failure. Common-cause identifies those 
MCSs potentially susceptible to a single failure cause. Therefore, a systematic minimal 
cutsets analysis can reveal all the information about the failure mechanism for a system. 
Minimal cutsets analysis has been carried out either by direct simulation method or 
analytical method. Direct simulation methods use the Monte Carlo method, which can 
only determine those cutsets that have a major contribution to system unreliability 
(Hauptmanns, 1988). Because of this limitation, i.e. being unable to calculate all possible 
cutsets for a tree, most computer codes have preferred to use the analytical method for 
minimal cutsets analysis. The analytical method uses Boolean algebra operations in order 
to express a fault tree in terms of its MCSs (Hauptmanns, 1988; AIChE, 2000). A top 
down approach or a bottom up approach with Boolean expressions determines all the 
possible cutsets for a fault tree (Hauptmanns, 1988; Henley, et al., 1996; Lees, 1996; 
Khan and Abbasi, 1999). The basic principle of the top down approach is that it starts 
with the top event and works its way down to the basic events. The bottom up approach 
follows the reverse order of the top down algorithm i.e., its starts from basic events and 
ends with the top-event. Since 1970, a few computer codes based on these two algorithms 
have been developed. In 1974, Fussell developed the MOCUS (method of obtaining 
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cutsets) code (Fussell, et al., 1974b), which can automatically determine MCSs for a fault 
tree. The MOCUS uses the top down algorithm for generating MCSs of a tree. Another 
computer code MICSUP (minimal cutsets, upward), developed by Pande (Henley, et al., 
1996), calculates the number of minimal cutsets by using the bottom up algorithm. 
MOCUS or MICSUP are restricted for determining the cutsets only for small fault trees. 
The fault tree construction for a process facility has wide diversification. Moreover, the 
process operations and its internal component variations always make a fault tree for the 
system is complicated in network and large in shape. Neither MOCUS nor MICSUP are 
capable of solving the MCSs for a large and complex tree. In order to solve all cutsets for 
a large tree it is essential to sub-divide the tree. The division of a large tree into its 
equivalent sub trees is known as fault tree modularization. Chatterjee (1975), Birnbaum 
et al. (1965), Locks (1981), Yllera (1988), Reay et al. (2002), Kohda et al. (1989) 
developed fault tree modularization algorithms for computer-aided FT A. Once all 
modules for a tree are determined, the MCSs for the tree can be determined by using the 
Boolean matrix transformation. The present study developed an integrated approach of 
modularization technique with Boolean matrix transformations for determining the exact 
number of minimal cutsets involved in a fault tree. The suitable modularization approach 
is adopted for this methodology on the basis of pros and cons analysis of existing 
modularization algorithm. The next section discusses details about the modularization 
and MCSs determination. 
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4.1.1 FAULT TREE MODULARIZATION 
The main problem with large fault trees is that the number of possible cutsets 
increases exponentially with the size of the tree (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996). Fault 
tree modularization permits a separate evaluation of the fault tree branches without 
changing the basic rules for the fault tree evaluation technique. Henley et al. (1996) 
identified the following problems to handle a large and complex fault tree: 
1. Manually it is impossible to determine the exact number of MCSs for a very large 
fault tree. 
2. It is difficult to estimate the cutsets importance of a large fault tree by manual 
calculations. 
3. Safety software requires high memory to run a large fault tree for detecting all 
failure modes of a system 
4. For large and complex fault trees, producing and analyzing the minimal cutsets 
only by top down or bottom up approaches may be a time-consuming process 
even for modem computers. 
The modularization technique first reduces the size of a fault tree by dividing the 
tree into equivalent independent sub trees which are known as independent modules for 
the tree. These modules are later analyzed with the top down or bottom up approach to 
enumerate all cutsets for the tree. Thus, fault tree modularization accelerates the 
computational time for evaluating a fault tree and at the same time it assists in module-
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wise analysis of a fault tree. Han (1988) and Henley et al. (1996) identified the following 
basic steps for modularizing a large fault tree: 
Step 1: Detect the unrepeated events in a fault tree. 
Step 2: Replace a gate with a module if the gate is composed of unrepeated events 
Step 3: In case of a gate composed of repeated and unrepeated events, replace this 
gate with a module, which contains unrepeated events. 
Step 4: Rearrange the fault tree with identified module. 
Step 5: Repeat the above procedures until no more modularization can be performed. 
Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b shows an illustrative example of a simple modularization 
technique used in large fault tree analysis. 
I 
I 
' 
' 
,,, ...... 
, 
, 
Replaced with a module 
Unrepeated Event 
Replaced with a module 
Figure 4.1a: Original fault tree 
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Figure 4.lb: Modularized Original fault tree 
4.1.2 MODULARIZATION ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTER-AIDED FTA 
A few algorithms have been developed specially for detecting the independent 
modules of a fault tree in computer-aided FfA. Chatterjee (1975) and Birnbaum et al. 
(1965) describe the properties of fault tree modularizing and its use in the fault tree 
analysis. Later on, Locks (1981) implemented these properties into non-coherent fault 
tree analysis. Chatterjee's algorithm requires all MCSs information as an input for a fault 
tree modularization. This algorithm is not able to find out all modules for a fault tree, if 
the fault tree has two or more repeated events. For these reasons this algorithm is not 
useful for the purpose of fault tree modularization. On the other hand, Locks' (1981) 
algorithm for fault tree modularization is restricted only for non-coherent fault tree 
analysis. Besides these two algorithms some other methods, such as super-modularizing 
(Yllera, 1988), the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) (Reay et al., 2002), KHIC algorithm 
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(Kohda et al., 1989) have also been developed for identifying the modules of a fault tree. 
Reay' s algorithm attempts to incorporate the features of neural networks to select the 
most ordering scheme for each module of a fault tree, based upon its individual 
characteristics. The BDDs for each module are constructed and culminated in a set of 
BDDs, which altogether represents the original system. The incorporation of neural-
network with the BDD diagram of Reay' s algorithm makes it complicated and difficult 
for applying on computer-aided fault tree analysis. The super-moduling algorithm 
decomposed a fault tree and expresses the tree in terms of a complex mathematical 
function, which is called structure function of a fault tree. This algorithm follows some 
brainstorming rules for labeling the basic events and gate events. Moreover, either BDDs 
or the super-moduling algorithm are not capable to analyze a non-coherent fault tree. 
KHIC algorithm is applicable for both coherent and non-coherent fault tree analysis. 
Further, this algorithm is easy to understand and does not add much complication for 
basic-events or gate events labeling. For these reasons, in present work, the KHIC 
algorithm has been incorporated in the computer-aided fault tree analysis methodology. 
4.1.3 MINIMAL CUTSETS DETERMINATION 
This methodology uses KHIC (Kohda et al., 1989) and the top down algorithm with 
Boolean matrix transformation (Hauptmanns, 1988) to determine the exact number of 
minimal cutsets. Figure 4.2 shows the algorithm for MCSs determination implemented in 
this study and the main steps of this algorithm are described in the following sections. 
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No 
Figure 4.2: Algorithm for MCSs determination 
KHIC Method for fault tree moduling: Kohda et al. (1989) developed KHIC algorithm 
for coherent and non-coherent fault tree analysis. The KIDC method involves four basic 
steps (Kohda et al., 1989): preparing a connection list, Possibility Checking (PC), 
Closeness Checking (CC), and Local Combination Checking (LCC). A connection list 
shows the attributes of the basic event and gates of the fault tree. PC examines whether 
the first element in its connection list is the same as the current gate event. CC examines 
whether the upper gate events that connect to input events appearing in the expansion 
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procedure is included in the sub-tree being examined. Finally, LCC looks for the 
existence of any logical combinations on the tree. To make this closeness check 
systematic, the method first allocates hierarchical levels to all gate events and examines 
them in ascending order. The KHIC method tries to obtain modules whose output event is 
not expressed by gate events. The stepwise modularization technique of KHIC algorithms 
are presented in Figure 4.3 The modules obtained from the KHIC algorithm are then used 
in Boolean matrix transformations to calculate minimal cutsets for a modularized fault 
tree. The basic steps involved in the KHIC algorithm for coherent fault tree moduling are 
as follows: 
i. Labeling the gate events and basic events of constructed fault tree. 
11. Prepare a connection list of the fault tree. 
111. Check the basic events under gate events. 
iv. Check the repeated basic events or gate events on the tree. 
Boolean matrix transformation: The modular approach expresses a fault tree in terms of 
equivalent sub trees. These modules are further expanded for developing a logic structure 
of the tree by using Boolean algebra operations. The logic structure of a fault tree can be 
induced from all possible MCSs of a fault tree. The top down or bottom up approach 
mentioned earlier, usually determines all the MCSs of a fault tree. Top down algorithms 
work on the principle that an OR gate increases the number of cutsets, while an AND 
gate enlarges the size of the cutsets (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996). Hauptmanns (1988) 
used the top down algorithm to develop a Boolean matrix, which expresses a logic 
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structure of a fault tree in terms of MCSs. A Boolean matrix represents the connections 
between the gate events and basic events of a fault tree. 
Data Structure 
Develop a data structure for a 
fault tree based on gate events 
and basic events numberin!l 
+ 
Allocate Hierarchy level of all 
gate events 
+ 
Prepare a connection list of tree 
based on developed hierarchical 
levels 
+ 
Check the PC, CC, LCC for all 
gate events based on ascending 
order of hierarchical levels 
Possibility Check (PC) 
Examine the first element under the current gate events is 
repeated in any where in listed gate events 
+ 
Closeness Check (CC) 
• Expand the input gate events until they reach to basic 
events or module tops previously identified 
• Examine every enumerated event except the current gate 
event is repeated in anywhere in among listed gate events 
Local combination checking (LCC) 
Logical Combinations of basic events are obtained from the 
connection list and the attributes of all basic events. 
f--
T 
Step 1 
1 
T 
Step 2 
_L 
T 
Step 3 j_ 
T 
Step4 
j_ 
Figure 4.3: Steps wise process of KHIC algorithm (Kohda et al., 1989) 
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4.1.4 INTREGATED ALGORITHM FOR MCSs DETERMINATION 
As discussed in the previous section, it is apparent that, to cope with the large and 
complex network of a fault tree, it is required to find out the possible modules for a tree 
and then the MCSs of the tree are determined. The current study developed an integrated 
approach of KHIC algorithm and Boolean matrix transformation for determining the 
exact number of cutsets for a fault tree. KHIC algorithm finds out the possible equivalent 
modules of a fault tree, and a Boolean matrix sort out the exact number of cutsets for the 
tree. The steps followed for the proposed algorithm are given below: 
i. Find all modules obtained by KHIC algorithm for the developed fault tree. 
n. The total number of gates represents the total number of rows of the matrix. 
iii. The columns of this matrix are divided into three blocks containing basic events 
in the first block, OR-gates in the second block and AND-gates in the third 
block. 
iv. Using "1" for a basic events or gate events connection and "0" for no 
connection fill the matrix. 
v. Replace each gate with corresponding basic events by using the top down 
algorithm. 
vi. Repeat the above procedures until all gate events are replaced with basic events. 
The final matrix is then solved for finding the number of cutsets involved in a tree. 
The rows with only basic events in the matrix represent minimal cutsets of the developed 
fault tree. The following section illustrates an example of qualitative evaluation of a fault 
tree as an application of the developed algorithm. 
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4.1.5 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE FOR QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF FAULT 
TREE 
Consider again the fault tree in Figure 3.3 in chapter 3 for the illustration of a 
complete methodology of qualitative evaluations of a fault tree that is developed in this 
study. 
Step 1: KHIC ALGORITHM FOR FAULT TREE MODULARIZATION 
The fault tree example in Figure 3.3 consists of three AND gates and three OR gates. The 
results obtained by the KHIC methodology are as follows: 
• With respect to connection list preparation, hierarchical levels are shown in Table 
4.1. The order of G6, G5, G4, G3, and G2 is not important because they are all 
bottom gate events. The hierarchical level of a gate event with input gate events is 
larger than those of its input gate events. For example, the number assigned to G 1 
is larger than for G2, G3, and G5. 
• Based on the above step (hierarchical level determination) - connection lists are 
obtained as shown in Table 4.2 where their attributes are also shown. This 
ordering process makes it easy to compare connection lists and their attributes. 
Table 4.1: Hierarchy of gate events Table 4.2: Connection list and attributes 
Gate level 1 G6 G2 (Gl, 1) BEl (Gl, 1) 
Gate level2 G5 G3 (G2, -1) BE2 (Gl, 1) 
Gate level3 G4 
Gate level4 G3 
Gate levelS G2 
Gate level6 Gl 
G4 (G3, 1) BE3 (G3, 1) 
G5 (G2, -1) )3E4 (G5, 1) 
G6 (G5, 1) BE5 (G4, -1) 
BE6 (G4, -1) 
BE7 (G4, -1) 
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• The results of the checking process for gate events (possibility, closeness, and 
local combination checks) show that no logical combinations are obtained from 
the fault tree in Figure 3.3. Module tops 03, 05, 02, and 01 result from the 
decomposition of the fault tree by modules. These results are captured in the 
following listing: 
i) For gate event G6: 
Possibility Checking (PC): The first element (FE) is 06 for BE6 and BE7. 
Closeness Checking (CC): The number of connecting gate events (NOCOE) is 2 for 
enumerated basic event BE6. Thus, 06 cannot be a module top. 
ii) For gate event G4: 
PC: FE is 04 for BE5 and BE6. 
CC: NOCOE is 2 for BE6. Thus, 04 cannot be a module top. 
iii) For gate event GS: 
PC: FE is 05 for BE4 and 06. 
CC: Appearing events in the expansion procedure (EP) are 05, 06, BE4, BE6, and BE7. 
Elements of their connection lists are 05, 06, and BE4. Thus, the closeness condition 
holds and 05 can be a module top. 
Local Combination Checking (LCC): Connection lists and their attributes for BE6 and 
BE7 are different, and no combination module is found. 
iv)For gate event G3: 
PC: FE is 03 for BE3 and 04. 
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CC: Appearing events in the EP are 03, 04, BE3, BE5, and BE6. Elements of their 
connection lists are 03, 04, and BE3. Thus, the closeness condition holds and 03 can be 
a module top. 
LCC: Connection lists and their attributes for BE5 and BE6 are different, and no 
combination module is found. 
v) For gate event G2: 
PC: FE is 02 for 03 and 05. 
CC: Appearing events in the EP are 02, 03, 05, 04, 06, BE3, BE4, BES, BE6, and BE7. 
Elements of their connection lists are 02, 03, and 05. Thus, the closeness condition 
holds and 03 can be a module top. 
LCC: Connection lists and their attributes for BE3, BE4, BE5, BE6, and BE7 are 
different and no combination module is found. 
vi) For gate event Gl: 
PC: FE is 01 for BEl, BE2, and 02. 
CC: Appearing events in EP are 01, 02, 03, 05, 04, 06, BEl, BE2, BE3, BE4, BES, 
BE6, and BE7. Elements of their connection lists are 01, 02, BEl, and BE2. Thus, the 
closeness condition holds and 01 can be a module top. 
LCC: Connection lists and their attributes for 02, 03, 05, 04, 06, BEl, BE2, BE3, BE4, 
BE5, BE6, and BE7 are different, and no combination module is found. 
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Step 2: BOOLEAN MATRIX TRANSFORMATION 
KHIC algorithm identified 4 modules for the fault tree: Gl, G2, G3, and G5. Table 
4.3 shows the Boolean matrix transformations of these modules. MCSs for each module 
and the whole tree are highlighted with different colors in this matrix. 
Table 4.3: Boolean Matrix transformation for MCSs determination 
Module 1 
(GS) 
Module2 
(G3) 
Module3 
(G2) 
Module4 
(Gl) 
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4.2 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
The quantitative evaluation of a fault tree includes a) absolute probabilities of the 
top event, b) quantitative importance of basic events and MCSs, and c) sensitivity 
evaluations. Top event probability estimates the frequency of an undesired event of a 
fault tree if all basic events occurred together. Quantitative importance of basic 
components and MCSs determine the percentage contributions of each basic event or 
cutsets to cause the undesired event. Sensitivity analysis estimates the changing effect of 
components in a system as well as the necessary design modifications for the system. 
The first step of quantitative analysis of a fault tree is top event probability 
calculation. A fault tree structure and estimated failure probabilities of all basic events are 
the two important parameters for calculating the top event probability of a fault tree. The 
calculation of top event probability is done either using minimal cutsets approach or gate-
by-gate approach in the Boolean expressions (AIChE, 2000). Gate-by-gate approach is 
simpler and requires simple Boolean calculation. This technique starts with the basic 
events and proceeds upward to the top event (Lawely, 1980). However, this approach 
calculates the top event probability without determining all cutsets of a tree. In this 
approach the top event probability suspects to have some percentage of error if the fault 
tree has a few more repeated basic events in different branches of an AND gate (AIChE, 
2000). Moreover, this approach performs better if the fault tree is small and simple in 
size. On the other hand, the minimal cutsets approach always gives a conservative 
estimation. Minimal cutsets approach represents the logical structure of the fault tree. 
Once the probabilities for all basic events and MCSs are estimated, the top event 
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probability by minimal cutsets approach is then calculated by using either equation 4.1 
(Yuhua et al., 2005) or equation 4.2 (Hauptmanns, 1980). 
{
n J n n n P(T)= u K. = L:P(K)- L P(KK.)+ L P(KK.K )+ ................. . 
. 1 J . 1 1 . . 2 1 J . j<k 3 1 J-K J= 1= 1<]= 1< = [4.1] 
.......... +(-l)n-l P(K1 K 2 ••• Kn )P(Kj) = TIFi (t) 
iEKi 
P(T) = 1 - IT [1 - K. ] 
. 1 1 1= 
[4.2] 
In the above equation, K1, K2, ... Kn represent the minimal cutsets, n is the total number of 
minimal cutsets and Fi(t) is the probability of a basic event BEi. Due to a low probability 
of occurrence, the first part of the equation 4.1 is generally used to calculate the top event 
probability of a tree (Yuhua et al., 2005). Equation 4.1 gives exact estimation of top event 
probability if the fault tree is large and consists of a large number of cutsets. Whereas 
equation 4.2 always gives a conservative result in cases of both small or large fault tree. 
Conventional FT A uses crisp basic events data to be used in equation 4.1 or 
equation 4.2 for quantitative evaluation of a fault tree. This quantitative evaluation of a 
fault tree can only give an approximation of the reality. Because of, variant failure 
modes, failure data collection error, design faults, poor understanding of failure 
mechanism, as well as the vagueness of system phenomena, it is a difficult task to get 
precise failure probability data of basic events. Therefore, the conventional FT A analysis 
(dependent on precise failure probability data of basic events) cannot give reliable results 
for process systems. Liang et al., (1993), Yuhua, et al. (2005) Ying, et al.(1998), Suresh 
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et. al. (1996), Wu (2004), Pan, et al. (1997) have described the limitations of 
conventional Ff A and also identified the following reasons for arising uncertainty in 
estimation of basic events data: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Human error on data collection 
Data sufficiency of new components 
Change of operational and environmental conditions of a system 
Lack of knowledge about the system and its failure mechanism 
Further, it is difficult task to get precise reliability data for all basic components at 
one time and many components of a fault tree may not have quantitative data at all. This 
limitation actually makes the whole fault tree analysis for a system questionable. In order 
to overcome such limitations, a fuzzy based methodology is developed in this study 
instead of using the normal probabilistic approach for quantitative evaluation of a fault 
tree. The fuzzy model for quantitative evaluation of Ff A is shown in Figure 4.4. The 
following sections of this chapter describe the fuzzy model for quantitative analysis of a 
fault tree with regards to fuzzy set theory fundamentals. 
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Figure 4.4: Fuzzy model for quantitative evaluation of Ff A 
4.2.1 FUZZY SET THEORY FUNDAMENTALS AND ITS APPLICATION TO FTA 
In conventional Ff A, failure probability of the top event is calculated by 
considering failure probability data of basic components of a system to be exact values 
(Wu, 2004; Yuhua et al., 2005). However, in practice, ambiguity of the system and 
component behavior, working environment of a system, as well as lack of sufficient 
statistical inference raise the difficulties during estimation of exact failure probability of 
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basic components (Singer, 1990; Liang et al., 1993; Ying et al., 1998; Wu, 2004; Yuhua 
et al., 2005). In order to avoid such uncertainty in probabilistic risk assessment, Lai et al. 
(1988) and Singer (1990) introduced the fuzzy set theory to safety and reliability 
problems. Later, Liang (1993), Sawyer (1994), Ying et al. (1998), Khan and Abbasi 
(1999), Shengping et al. (2000) implemented it into the PTA technique. 
4.2.1.1 FUZZY PROBABILITY 
The imprecise probability value of a basic event may be defined as "about 0.5'' or 
"around 0.5''. For the estimating of such vague quantities or linguistic ideas on 
probability estimation, fuzzy probability analysis is appropriate. Fuzzy probability uses 
the fuzzy number, which is expressed by a fuzzy set and characterized by its membership 
function, J..l. Its can be represented by a triangular or trapezoidal shape or bell shaped 
membership function (Cheng et al., 2000). As an example, Figure 4.5 represents the 
trapezoidal representation of an event probability "around 0.4" (Misra et al., 1990; Lai et 
al., 1988). Thus, in trapezoidal representation, the fuzzy probability of an event BEi can 
be denoted by the PBE . 1':!. four-tuple (PiA, PiB, Pic, PiD) (Figure 4.5). The 
1 
corresponding membership functions are: 
0 0 ~ p~ PiA 
1- piB -p piA~ p~ piB 
piB -PiA [4.3] f.l- = PBE;(P) 1 piB ~ p~ Pic 
1- p-Pic Pic~ p ~ PiD 
piD -Pic 
0 piD~ p ~ 1 
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0 0.4 
Probability of failure 
a) About 0.4 concept 
Probability of failure 
b) Trapezoidal Representation 
( PsE1 ~ PiA, PiB, Pic, PiD) 
Figure 4.5: Fuzzy probability representation 
4.2.1.2 FUZZY ARITHMETIC OPERATION 
In fuzzy fault tree analysis, probability of all basic events is expressed in terms of 
fuzzy numbers. Hence, in order to estimate the fuzzy top event probability, it is necessary 
to use fuzzy arithmetic operations for the "AND" gate and the "OR" gate operation of a 
fault tree. Fuzzy arithmetic operations follow the rules of fuzzy set theory and the use of 
the extension principle. Based on this extension principle Misra et al. (1990), Lai et al. 
(1988) and Liang et al. (1993) have described the fuzzy arithmetic operations for fault 
tree analysis. The fuzzy arithmetic operations for determining failure possibilities under 
the AND or OR gate are: 
1. The fuzzy probability under then-array and the AND gate with inputs BE1, BE2, ••..• , 
BEn (Figure 4.6) is: 
rfND = rBE ® rBE ® ·········· ··· ® rBE 1 2 n [4.4] 
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Tanaka et al. (1981) provide an approximation procedure for the multiplication of two 
- -fuzzy numbers. If PBE 1 and PBE 2 are two fuzzy probabilities of basic events then the 
fuzzy multiplication rule is defined as 
[4.5] 
where, P1A,Pm, P1c, Pm and P2A, P28, Pzc, Pzo are the four-tuple values of each basic 
event. 
Figure 4.6: 'AND' Gate 
2. The fuzzy probability under then-array an the OR gate with inputs BE1, BEz, ..... , BEn 
(Figure 4.7) is: 
-OR [ - - - J PT = 1 - (1 - PBE ) ® (1 - PBE ) ® ............. ® (1 - PBE ) 
1 2 n 
[4.6] 
Similarly, agam if PBE1 is a fuzzy set probability of a basic event then the fuzzy 
complementation rule is defined as 
1-PBEI =1-PlA'1-PlB,l-Plc•1-Pm [4.7] 
where, P1A, Pm, P1c, Pm are the four-tuple values of the basic event. 
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Figure 4.7: 'OR' Gate 
4.2.2 Fuzzy Based Probability Analysis 
The minimal cutsets obtained from qualitative evaluation of a fault tree are used for 
probability analysis of FT A. In the probabilistic approach, the uncertainties in component 
data propagate through these cutsets to the top event failure probability, further it affect 
the sensitivity analysis of a fault tree. Hence, if the basic events probability data are not 
precise, then the whole fault tree analysis will give a wrong prediction about the system 
reliability. Fuzzy based probability analysis attempts to define a basic event data into a 
fuzzy set and uses it in subsequent computations. Finally, the value is defuzzified to get a 
precise top event probability. The procedure for the fuzzy based probability analysis 
consists of the following steps: 
Conversion of Basic Events Probability Data to Fuzzy Probability Data: In fuzzy based 
probability analysis, the imprecise failure probabilities of basic events are refined by 
characterizing the basic event data with a suitable membership function. In this paper, 
trapezoidal membership function is recommended for converting the basic event data. 
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PiA, Pm, Pic and PiD are the left-hand and right-hand bounds of this function. Two 
approaches can be applied to obtain left-hand and right-hand bounds: i) from the point 
median value and the error factor; and ii) from the direct assignment based on expert 
assessment (Liang et al., 1993). PROFAT (Khan and Abbasi, 1999) uses one trapezoidal 
function for data fuzzification, which under limit the reliability predictions in extreme 
condition (basic events having high failure probability value) and also gives a wrong 
estimation of top event probability. To overcome this difficulty, the proposed 
methodology uses two trapezoidal membership functions for the different conditions of 
basic event probability data range. The first trapezoidal condition is used for the 
probability data lies in the range of "0 to 0.5'', and the second one is used for the values 
between the ranges of 0.5 to 1.0. The calculating strategy for the lower bound and the 
unbound values of each trapezoidal membership function are given below with the 
examples. 
Condition 1: 0 ~Probability value ~ 0.5 
Lower bound value PiA= Probability valuex0.5 
Lower bound value Pm =Probability value x0.75 
Upper bound value Pic = Probability value x 1.25 
Upper bound value Pic =Probability value x 1. 5 
Example: The conversion of the probability value "around 0.1" is given below and its 
trapezoidal representation is shown in Figure 4.8. 
PiA= 0.1x0.5 = 0.05 Pm = 0.1x0.75 = 0.075 
Pic= 0.1x1.25 = 0.125 PiD = 0.1xl. 5 = 0.15 
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Probability of failure 
Figure 4.8: Trapezoidal representation of probability value "around 0.1" 
Condition 2: 0 .5 :::; Probability value :::; 1.0 
fl. = (1- Probability value)/4 
Lower bound value PiA= (Probability value -(2x fl.)) 
Lower bound value Pm = (Probability value -fl.) 
Upper bound value Pic = (Probability value +fl.) 
Upper bound value Pic= (Probability value+ 2x fl.) 
Example: The conversion technique for probability value "around 0.6" is given below 
and its trapezoidal representation is shown in Figure 4.9. 
fl.= (1- 0.6)/4=0.1 
PiA= (0.6- (2x0.1)) = 0.4 Pm = (0.6- 0.1)) = 0.5 
Pic= (0.6 + 0.1)) = 0.70 PiD = (0.6 + (2x0.1)) = 0.8 
0.8 
0.6 
Jl 0.4 
0.2 
0 0.6 
0 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Probability of failure 
Figure 4.9: Trapezoidal representation of probability value "around 0.6" 
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PROFAT uses one trapezoidal function to convert the basic event crisp data to fuzzy 
data. Hence it performs better when the basic event has lower probability values, i.e., 
values "around 0.5''. However, in cases like a fault tree example in Figure 4.10, which 
has two gates and four basic events, which have the probability values "around 0.4", 
"around 0.7" ,"around 0.8"and "around 0.9" respectively, PROFAT estimates the top 
event probability for this tree as 0.833. The calculated exact top event probability for this 
tree is 0.949. The top event probability estimated by the present algorithm for this 
example is 0.943, which is close to the exact value. 
Figure 4.10: Fault tree example 
Fuzzy Top event Probability Calculation: Quantitative analysis of a fault tree attempts to 
calculate the probabilities of the top event and the minimal cutsets (MCSs ). To minimize 
the error due to uncertainty in the basic events probability data, the present algorithm 
used fuzzified probability data for quantification of a fault tree. Once the fuzzy 
probability for all basic events and MCSs are estimated, the fuzzy top event probability is 
then calculated by using equation 4.8. Fuzzy arithmetic operations rules are employed to 
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estimate top event as well as minimal cutset probability estimation. The obtained results 
(the top event and minimal cutsets probability) are also a continuous fuzzy number with a 
membership function that is defined by a trapezoidal function. 
PT =1-b-c\)®(1-c2)® ............ ®(1-cn)] [4.8] 
-Here, C 1 , C 2 ......... . . . . . . . C n are the fuzzy probabilities of all 
minimal cutsets. And PT represent the four-tuple values of top event fuzzy probability, 
e.g., (PT~ P A(T), Ps(T), Pqn, Pam). 
Most Likely Failure Probability Estimation: After fuzzy arithmetic operations, the result 
of a fault tree becomes a fuzzy variable, which further needs to be translated into a crisp 
value (Klir et al., 2001). The objective is to derive a single crisp numeric value that 
represents the most inferred fuzzy values of the estimated fuzzy variable. Defuzzification 
is an inverse transformation which maps the output from the fuzzy domain back into the 
crisp domain (Klir et al., 2001). Several methods exist for the defuzzification process: the 
centre of area method, the centre of maxima method, mean of maxima method, and the 
weighted average method. The methodology here uses the weighted average method for 
determining the most top event probability of a fault tree. The weighted average method 
estimates the most inferred top event fuzzy value using the following equation: 
p A (T) ·ll P A (T) + PB (T) ·llP B(T) + Pc (T) ·ll PC(T) + Pn (T) ·ll P D (T) 
M (PT) = [4.9] 
J..lp A(T) + J.!PB(T) + llPC(T) + llPD(T) 
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where, M (PT) is the most likely fuzzy top event probability; P Acn, P BCT), P ccn, P om are 
left and right bounds of top event fuzzy probability and M- PT is the corresponding 
membership grade of each value. 
The fuzzy probability analysis of this methodology uses three steps to convert the 
basic events data into fuzzy sets and calculates top event probability for a Ff A. The 
three consecutive steps are: 
i. Crisp data fuzzification of basic events. 
n. Fuzzy top event probability calculation. 
111. Defuzzification of Fuzzy top event probability. 
4.2.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Top event probability provides only the idea about the system conditions, for 
example, system success or failure states for a given time period. Sensitivity analysis 
helps to evaluate the percentage contribution of each basic event that leads to a system 
failure (top event) and also estimates unavailability and failure frequencies of the basic 
event, which have to be changed in order to maintain a predefined system's top event 
probability. In addition, sensitivity analysis also helps to identify three important 
decisions for the design modifications of a system: the weakest link of the system; a 
better design alternative; and how to evaluate the effect of the adopted solution on system 
safety (Contini et al., 2000). In this study the sensitivity analysis for a system is evaluated 
on the basis of investigating the fuzzy weighted index (FWI) of each basic event, and the 
cutsets importance of a fault tree. 
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Fuzzy Weighted Index Estimation: In FfA, the contribution of basic events that leads 
the top event failure is generally measured in terms of the improvement index of the 
system. Fuzzy weighted index is another form of estimating the improvement index of a 
basic event, when the failure probability of a basic event is defined through fuzzy 
functions. This is estimating by eliminating each basic event from the tree and evaluating 
its impact (in terms of weight) on the tree (Tanaka et al., 1983; Misra et al., 1990; Liang 
et al., 1993; Yiang et al., 1998; Cheong, 2004). In the present work, the following 
modified equation is used for measuring fuzzy improvement or weighted index of a basic 
event: 
where, PT refer to top event probability with all event occurring, PTi refer to top event 
probability without PiA(Ti)· 
Cutsets Importance: The additional feature of measuring cutsets importance is added in 
this methodology for identifying the most likely path that leads to the top-event. In order 
to measure the cutsets importance, the output fuzzy function of each minimal cutset is 
needed to convert into crisp value through the defuzzification method (Klir et al., 2001). 
The cutset contribution to the top event is then estimated by using the following equation: 
Qj 
lei = -xlOO [4.11] 
Qo 
where, fi= the probability of cutsets importance, Qj= the fuzzy probability of cutsets 
frequency; and Q0= most likely top event probability. 
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SUMMARY 
The overall methodology for a fault tree evaluation has been described in this 
chapter. The qualitative evaluation of this methodology follows fault tree modularization 
and Boolean matrix transformation for determining all possible MCSs for a tree. And the 
quantitative evaluation of the methodology uses the fuzzy set theory for the probability 
analysis and sensitivity analysis of the fault tree. 
KHIC algorithm moduled a large fault tree into the equivalent sub trees and 
Boolean matrix transformed these trees into the Boolean functions and determines the 
possible MCSs for the fault tree. Once all MCSs have been elucidated, the fuzzy 
probability analysis follows data fuzzification, fuzzy MCSs probability estimation, fuzzy 
top event probability calculation and defuzzification process to calculate the most likely 
top event probability of the tree. Further, the FWI and cutsets importance in the present 
methodology estimates a fuzzy based basic events and cutsets contribution to an 
undesired event for a fault tree. 
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Chapter 5 
CASE STUDY AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
In order to verify the methodology of computer-aided FT A, a case study is 
presented in this chapter to illustrate the proposed methodology. Further, an uncertainty 
analysis of this case is also carried out to make the comparisons between the proposed 
methodology and the existing strategy of Ff A. This case study was previously studied by 
Wang et al. (2005). He used a Ff A in this case study for improving the design of an 
activated carbon filter safeguard system, whereas we have used this case study for 
comparison and uncertainty purposes. The subsequent section of this chapter will give a 
detailed fault tree analysis and the uncertainty quantification of this case study, which 
was obtained by using the proposed methodology for the fuzzy computer-aided Ff A tool. 
5.1 A CASE STUDY 
A FfA, based on the proposed methodology, is conducted for an activated carbon 
filter safeguard system. The objectives of the study are to a) identify all possible MCSs 
that may cause the top event to occur, b) determine the fuzzy top event probability and 
the most likely fuzzy value of the top event, and c) calculate the contribution of each 
event in terms of FWI and the cutsets importance that are causing the top event. The 
stepwise analysis of the described methodology of fuzzy computer-aided FfA tool is 
given below. 
66 
Chapter 5: Case study and Uncertainty analysis 
5.1.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
0-ethyl S- (2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methyl phosphonothiolate (C 11H26N02PS) is 
the chemical name of VX. The US Army Safety System defines three major hazard 
scenarios of the VX neutralization process, which are VX agent release, personal 
injury/illness, and system loss. The vent streams from the process unit contain trace 
amounts of VX agent and volatile organic compounds (VOCs ). These are passed through 
the cascade ventilation system, which consists of four-supply air handling units and eight 
exhaust activated carbon filter units, to remove VOCs and VX agents from the streams 
before transferring into the building exhaust system. 
5.1.2 FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT 
The identified undesired top event by Wang et al. (2005) for this system was that 
''fails to capture VX and VOCs release agents due to the failure of carbon filter system". 
Wang et al. (2005) already identified all the possible hazard scenarios and their logical 
dependency for causing the top event of the fault tree. Using these identified hazards and 
their information, a fault tree for the VX neutralization process was constructed in the 
GUI. Figure 5.1 shows the fault tree for the case study. Basic events, intermediate events, 
top event, and gate events (Figure 5.1) are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. 
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oata FUZZ!flcat10n 
Figure 5.1: Fault tree diagram of the case study in the Gill 
Table 5.1: Name of the basic event and their notifications 
Basic Events Name of the Basic Event Notification 
BEl Carbon Filter System Improperly Designed 
BE2 Carbon bed filters become saturated with HC 
BE3 Both of moisture indicators MIT -1905 A and B fails to operate 
BE4 Supply air Heater elements fails to operate 
BE5 The Exhaust air high humidity interlock controller fails to respond 
BE6 Process heat Loads do not heat saturated supply air because process is shut down 
BE7 Ton container stream cleaning is occurring 
BE8 TCC stream cleaning flow rate is two times normal 
BE9 Loss of chilled cooling water supply 
BElO 1 of 2 cooling water isolation valves is inadvertently closed 
BEll 1 of 2 cooling water isolation valves is plugged 
BE12 Air supply dehumidification system improperly deigned 
BE13 Loss of chilled cooling water supply 
BE14 Ambient air relative humidity > 70% 
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Table 5.2: Name of the top event (TE) and intermediate event (IMi) 
Basic Events Name of the Basic Event Notification 
TE Fails to capture VX and VOCs release agents due to the failure of 
carbon filter system 
IMl Supply air Heater elements fails to operate on high humidity 
IM2 Exhaust air received humidity >> 70% 
IM3 TCC stream cleaning flow rate is too high and condenser fails 
IM4 Loss of supply air dehumidification when ambient air> 70% relative humidity 
IM5 Loss of supply air dehumidification system 
5.1.3 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
The fault tree for this identified top event, i.e., failure of carbon filter system to 
capture VX and VOCs release agents from the exhaust (Figure 5.1), consists of eight 
gates and fourteen basic events. The generated connection list for this fault tree is shown 
in Figure 5.2. This list is further used in determining the modules of the fault tree. The 
modularizing algorithm of the methodology identifies eight modules, which are shown in 
Figure 5.3. After sorting out all possible modules for the tree, the Boolean matrix 
transformation was then used for finding the MCSs (Figure 5.1). The Boolean matrix 
transformation of these modules gave twenty minimal cutsets (MCSs). Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
listed all the modules and the MCSs for the fault tree along with the minimal cutsets and 
their number in each module. 
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BE3 BE4 BE5 
BE6 G5 G7 
BE7 BE8 G6 
G7 AND G8 BE14 
G6 OR BElO BEll BE9 
G8 OR BEU BE12 
Figure 5.2: Connection list of gate events and basic events for the fault tree 
Gl 
G2 
G3 
G4 
G5 
G7 
GO 
G8 
OR 
AND 
OR 
OR 
AND 
AND 
OR 
OR 
BEl BE2 G2 
G3 G4 
BE3 BE4 BE5 
BE6 G5 G7 
BE7 BE8 GO 
G8 BE14 
BE9 BElO BEll 
BE12 BE13 
Figure 5.3: Obtained modules for the fault tree 
Table 5.3: Minimal cutsets for the modules 
Module Gate Minimal Cutsets Cutsets in Top Type Each module 
08 OR (BE12), (BE13) 2 
07 AND (BE12, BE14) 2 (BE13, BE14) 
06 OR (BE9), (BElO),(BEll) 3 
05 AND (BE7, BE8, BE9) 
(BE7, BE8, BElO) 3 
(BE7, BE8, BEll) 
04 OR (BE6), (05), (0 6) 3 
03 OR (BE3), (BE4), (BE5) 3 
02 OR @,04) 1 
01 OR (BEl), (BE2), (02) 20 
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Table 5.4: Minimal cutsets for the fault tree 
MCSs 
BEl 
BE2 
BE3 BE6 
BE4 BE6 
BE5 BE6 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 
BE3 BE12 BE14 
BE4 BE12 BE14 
BE5 BE12 BE14 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 
BE3 BE13 BE14 
BE4 BE13 BE14 
BE5 BE13 BE14 
5.1.4 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
This study uses the fuzzy concept in probability analysis of the fault tree. The 
fuzzified data for the basic events are shown in Figure 5.4. Fuzzy probability analysis of 
the current work uses these fuzzified data for the fault tree evaluation. The most likely 
top event probability estimated for this tree is 2.954E-04. Table 5.5 shows the fuzzy top 
event probability analysis results for the case study. 
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Fuzzified 
( 5.000E-05 7.500E-05 1.250E-05 l.SOOE-05) 
l.OOOE-07 ( S.OOOE-08 7.500E-08 1.250E-07 l.SOOE-07) 
6.640E-04 ( 3.320E-04 4.980E-04 8.300E-04 9.960E-04) 
7.450E-03 ( 3.725E-03 5.587E-03 9.312E-03 1.117E-02) 
l.OOOE-04 ( S.OOOE-05 7.500E-05 1.250E-05 1.500E-05) 
2.200E-02 ( 1 lOOE-02 1.650E-02 2.750E-02 3.300E-02) 
8.330E-02 (4 165E-02 6.247E-02 1.041E-01 1.249E-01) 
l.OOOE-02 ( 5.000E-03 7.500E-03 1.250E-02 l.SOOE-02) 
3.700E-05 ( 1.850E-05 2.775E-05 4.625E-05 5.550E-05) 
2.000E-02 ( l.OOOE-02 l.SOOE-02 2.500E-02 3.000E-02) 
6.910E-02 ( 3.455E-02 5.182E-02 8.637E-02 1.036E-Ol ) 
l.OOOE-03 ( S.OOOE-04 7.500E-04 1.250E-03 l.SOOE-03) 
3.700E-05 ( 1.850E-05 2.775E-05 4.625E-05 5.550E-05) 
2.510E-01 ( 1.255E-01 1.882E-01 3.137E-01 3.765E-01) 
Figure 5.4: Fuzzified data of basic events 
Table 5.5: Fuzzy top event probability estimation for case study 
Fuzzy probability analysis PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) PD(T) 
Top Event Fuzzy set 9.553E-05 1.778E-04 4.131E-04 5.669E-04 
Most likely Top Event 2.954E-04 
5.1.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The cutsets importance module in the sensitivity analysis revealed that path [BEl 
and BE4-BE6] has the maximum probability of occurrence, while paths [BE5-BE13-
BE14], [BE3-BE7-BE8-BE9], [BE4-BE7-BE8-BE9], [BE5-BE7-BE8-BE9] and [BES-
BE7-BE8-BE11] have the least. The fuzzy weighted index (FWI) of each basic events 
helps to conclude that particular attention must be given to the basic events BEl, BE4, 
and BE6, as these are most likely to cause the top event. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 shows the 
detailed sensitivity analysis for the case study. 
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Table 5.6: FWI for different events 
Event not occurring Probability Factor FWI Improvement 
0 2.954E-04 O.OOOE-00 0.00 
BEl 1.955E-04 3.999E-04 13.54 
BE2 2.954E-04 3.998E-07 0.01 
BE3 2.797E-04 6.894E-05 2.33 
BE4 1.183E-04 7.737E-04 26.19 
BE5 2.931E-04 1.038E-05 0.35 
BE6 1.035E-04 8.356E-04 28.29 
BE7 2.946E-04 4.805E-06 0.16 
BE8 2.946E-04 4.805E-06 0.16 
BE9 2.955E-04 1.995E-09 0.00 
BElO 2.953E-04 1.078E-06 0.04 
BEll 2.948E-04 3.725E-06 0.13 
BE12 2.930E-04 1.211E-05 0.41 
BE13 2.954E-04 4.480E-07 0.02 
BE14 2.929E-04 1.255E-05 0.43 
Table 5.7: Cutsets importance for all MCSs 
MCSs FuzzyMCSs MCSs Importance Probabilities (in percentage) 
BEl l.OOOE-04 33.85 
BE2 l.OOOE-07 0.03 
BE3-BE6 1.552E-05 5.25 
BE4-BE6 1.741E-04 58.94 
BE5-BE6 2.338E-06 0.79 
BE3-BE7-BE8-BE9 2.822E-11 0.00 
BE4-BE7 -BE8-BE9 3.166E-10 0.00 
BE5-BE7 -BE8-BE9 4.250E-12 0.00 
BE3-BE12-BE14 1.979E-07 0.07 
BE4-BE12-BE14 2.221E-06 0.75 
BE5-BE12-BE14 2.981E-08 0.01 
BE3-BE7-BE8-BE10 1.525E-08 0.01 
BE4-BE7-BE8-BE10 1.711E-07 0.06 
BE5-BE7 -BE8-BE10 2.297E-09 0.00 
BE3-BE7-BE8-BE11 5.270E-08 0.02 
BE4-BE7-BE8-BE11 5.913E-07 0.20 
BE5-BE7-BE8-BE11 7.937E-09 0.00 
BE3-BE13-BE14 7.323E-09 0.00 
BE4-BE13-BE14 8.216E-08 0.03 
BE5-BE13-BE14 1.103E-09 0.00 
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5.2 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Risk assessment methodology uses the available information of a risk event and 
then utilizes it to make the decisions for minimizing the risk right from the source. 
Uncertainties include data uncertainty, model uncertainty, human error uncertainty, and 
so on (McCormick, 1981; Smith, 2002; AIChE, 2000). Further, uncertainty is a central 
issue in the utilization of the risk management. Hence, uncertainty quantifications should 
proceed before making any decision regarding risk estimation methodology or a 
developed model for risk assessment management. Uncertainty analysis is the part of the 
risk assessment process, which numerically or graphically estimates the effect of data 
error and model inaccuracy on the risk estimation process. Past studies have also shown 
that model uncertainty, data uncertainty, and quality uncertainty are the main sources of 
uncertainties for the risk analysis of process facilities (Henley et al., 1996; AIChE, 2000, 
Smith, 2002). Figure 5.5 represents the types of uncertainty associated with each source. 
Among all of the uncertainty sources to date, the data uncertainty is the most critical issue 
for the risk assessment process (AIChE, 2000). However, there is no specific 
mathematical model for uncertainty analysis. Veseley, et al. (1981), Henley and 
Kumamoto (1996) and Abrahamsson (2002) describe a few methods for the uncertainty 
analysis of a FfA. 
In present study an uncertainty analysis for the case study has been carried out to 
determine the cumulative error of imprecise basic events data that accumulates on the top 
event of a fault tree. Both conventional probability approach and fuzzy approach are used 
for this purpose. The uncertainty analysis for this case study is finally used for comparing 
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the conventional Ff A approach and fuzzy Ff A approach with respect to their error 
adjustment in computer-aided Ff A. The detailed procedures of these two approaches are 
given in the following sections. 
Source of uncertainty 
1f ,, 
Models uncertainty Data uncertainty Quality uncertainty 
Includes: Includes: Includes: 
i) Model adequacy i) Incomplete or biased data i) Knowledge of process systems 
ii) Mathematical and numerical ii) Unavailable data for specific and analysis model 
approximations in the model case ii) Human error in data estimation 
iii) Assumptions or validation of iii) Estimation procedure of data iii) Historical information of event 
the model collection sequence and behavior 
Figure 5.5: Source uncertainty in risk analysis of process facility (AIChE, 2000) 
5.2.1 CONVENTIONAL PROBABILITY APPROACH 
In the conventional approach, Monte Carlo simulation technique is used for the 
uncertainty analysis of a complex fault tree network (AIChE, 2000; Abrahamsson, 2002). 
It uses the following steps for assessing parameters uncertainty: 
i. Select a distribution to describe possible values of a parameter. 
u. Generate data from this distribution. 
iii. Use the generated data as probable values of the parameters in the model to 
produce output. 
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In this study, log-normal distribution is used for generating basic event data, 
assuming the error percentage in all basic events is a amount. The location and scale 
parameters for each error in the basic events of this case study are shown in Tables 5.8 
and 5.9 respectively. The following two equations are used for calculating these two 
parameters of log-normal distribution (Henley and Kumamoto, 1996): 
Jl =In (Q) [5.1] 
[5.2] 
where, J..l'= location Parameter; Q = median value of basic event probability; a = 
percentage level of error in basic events i.e., 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% ; a = scale 
parameter. 
Table 5.8: Location parameter for basic events 
Basic Events Basic Event data ( Q ) Location Parameter (f.l') 
BEl l.OOOE-04 -9.210 
BE2 l.OOOE-07 -16.118 
BE3 6.640E-04 -7.317 
BE4 7.450E-03 -4.900 
BE5 l.OOOE-04 -9.210 
BE6 2.200E-02 -3.817 
BE7 8.330E-02 -2.485 
BE8 l.OOOE-02 -4.605 
BE9 3.700E-05 -10.205 
BE10 2.000E-02 -3.912 
BEll 6.910E-02 -2.672 
BE12 l.OOOE-03 -6.908 
BE13 3.700E-05 -10.205 
BE14 2.510E-01 -1.382 
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Table 5.9: Scale parameter of log-normal distribution 
Error in basic event data (0 Scale parameter ( 0 
5% 0.2223 
10% 0.3125 
15% 0.3803 
20% 0.4366 
After generating 8000 random samples of each basic event, the top event 
probability is calculated using the minimal cutsets approach. Further, the percentage 
deviation with respect to exact top event probability for each a level of error is also 
calculated by using equation 5.3. Results are shown in Table 5.10. Normal error 
distribution approach is commonly used in most of the commercial software such as 
CARA faultTree, Relax fault Tree, FaultTree+. 
PT (calculated ) - PT (actual ) 
E = X 100 
PT(actual ) 
[5.3] 
In this equation, E is percentage of deviation in top event probability, PT (calculated) is 
estimated top event probability, PT (actual) is actual value of top event probability. 
5.2.2 FUZZY APPROACH 
Khan and Abbasi (1999) developed an approach for uncertainty analysis of fuzzy 
FT A. In this approach, the events data are initially fuzzified by considering a definite 
amount of error in all basic event data and the top event probability is then calculated by 
using these fuzzified data. Besides this approach of uncertainty analysis, the present study 
has also developed an uncertainty analysis model for fuzzy FT A. This model generates a 
number of random samples for each basic event using two distributions in the whole 
trapezoidal region. The trapezoidal region of each basic event in this model first 
77 
Chapter 5: Case study and Uncertainty analysis 
subdivided into three sections and then for generating random samples, triangular 
distribution is used for the first and third sections, and uniform distribution is used for the 
second section, of the trapezoidal region. Figure 5.6 shows the model used for generating 
random sample of the basic events. 
0.8 
0.6 
!l G) 0.4 
0.2 
p 
0 
Pic 
--, 
0 
Figure 5.6. Uncertainty analysis model for fuzzy Ff A 
In this figure the triangular section 1 and 3 uses the triangular distributions and 
rectangular section 2 uses the uniform distributions for generating random samples for 
basic events. The lower bound and upper bound value (i.e., PiA, Pm, Pic, PiD) of each 
basic event (trapezoidal fuzzy set) is used to estimate the distribution parameters. 
To compare the error robustness of fuzzy FfA with conventional FfA, this study 
uses both approaches for uncertainty quantifications. In the first approach (Khan and 
Abbasi, 1999), basic data are fuzzified considering all basic events with 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20% error. These fuzzified data are then used to calculate the top event probability. The 
deviation of top event probability is then calculated by using equation 5.3. In the second 
approach of this study, different levels (5%, 10%, 15%, 20% error) of error are 
considered in basic event data. Then the random data for the trapezoidal fuzzy set of each 
basic event are generated using triangular and uniform distributions. The top event 
probability for the fault tree and its deviations from the exact value are calculated by 
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using equation 5.3. 
As expected, both approaches almost predict the same results. The results could get 
significantly different in case of a very complex network. Table 5.10 presents a detailed 
comparison study of uncertainty propagation for both approaches. It also illustrates that if 
basic events data are not accurately measured, then error will accumulates throughout the 
top event probability calculation. 
Table 5.10: Error robustness of fuzzy approach and conventional probability approach 
Considered Approach Top event Deviation ( 0 
error in probability 
data [Pncatculatedl] 
Fuzzy First approach 2.959E-04 
-2.0% 
5% approach Second approach 2.952E-04 
Conventional Probability approach 2.920E-04 1.0% 
Fuzzy First approach 2.975E-04 
-3.0% 
10% approach Second approach 2.961E-04 
Conventional Probability approach 3.327E-04 13.3% 
Fuzzy First approach 2.985E-04 
-3.5% 
15% approach Second approach 3.001E-04 
Conventional Probability approach 3.486E-04 20.5% 
Fuzzy First approach 3.036E-04 
-5.0% 
20% approach Second approach 3.027E-04 
Conventional Probability approach 4.630E-04 60% 
Actual top event probability 
No Error [PT(actuat)l (considering all basic 2.892 E-04 
event data has accurately measured) 
SUMMARY 
A case study has been discussed in this chapter to demonstrate the applications of 
the proposed methodology. This case study is a VX neutralization process adapted from 
the Wang et al. (2005), which is extensively discussed in the literature. Process 
description, fault tree development in the GUI, fault tree evaluation, and sensitivity 
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analysis of this case study are presented under section 5.1. The developed model for 
uncertainty analysis of fuzzy Ff A has been discussed in section 5.2.2. The comparison of 
conventional approach with fuzzy approach for FT A has also been shown in this chapter. 
The results from the uncertainty analysis show that this methodology gives a more 
consistent result for Ff A, even when the basic events have error during their data 
estimation. 
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Chapter 6 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents results and discussion of the proposed methodology and the 
case study illustrated in the previous chapter. In this chapter FT A results were compared 
with that of commercial software packages. Besides the comparison of the results, this 
chapter also gives a brief account of the current work and existing methodology with 
respect to the analysis strategy of FT A, conventional FT A and fuzzy FT A with regards to 
the uncertainty analysis. 
6.1 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
A complete FT A for the process facility takes MCSs analysis, probability analysis, 
and sensitivity analysis into account. The MCSs are the minimal combinations of basic 
events that can result in the top event. Probability analysis estimates the probability of 
occurrence of the top event and the MCSs. The sensitivity analysis gives a numerical 
evaluation of the relative contribution of each basic event and MCSs to cause the top 
event. The complete analysis of a fault tree for the case study was already shown in 
section 5.1. The significant analyses of this case study obtained by using the described 
methodology are given below. 
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Fault tree evaluation: 
Number of MCSs = 20 
Most likely top event probability= 2.954E-04 
Most important cutsets: 
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i. BE4-BE6 has 58.94% contribution to cause the top event 
ii. BEl has 33.85% contribution to cause the top event 
Basic events improvement: 
1. The improvement value for BE6 is 28.29. 
ii. The improvement value for BE6 is 26.19. 
The following sections use these FT A results for the companson of the proposed 
methodology and the available strategy for FT A. 
6.2 COMPARATIVE STUDY 
Three types of comparisons between the proposed and existing methodology have 
been carried out in this chapter. The first comparison, given in section 6.2.1, is based on 
the models used in the current work and existing commercial packages. The second 
comparison, in section 6.2.2, is made by using the results obtained from the described and 
available methodologies. Finally, uncertainty analysis is conducted to compare these 
methodologies with respect to their error robustness. This is given in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.1 COMPARISON USING METHODOLOGY 
As discussed earlier, few computer-aided tools exist for FTA. The current study 
developed a revised methodology for the fuzzy based computer-aided FT A tool to yield 
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more efficient and accurate analysis from a fault tree. A comparison of this methodology 
with the ones used by existing software packages for the fault tree analysis has been 
depicted in Table 6.1. It is evident from the table that, for the most part, the proposed 
methodology is more advanced than the counterpart. The developed methodology should 
give a more accurate estimation for a fault tree and the risk analysis as well. 
Table 6.1: FfA methodology used in existing software packages and in the current work 
Sl.No Fault tree analysis Used in existing Used in current work 
software packages 
1 Modules finding for a BDD, super-moduling, KHIC algorithm fault tree etc. 
MCSs determination MOCUS or MICSUP KHIC algorithm with 2 for large fault tree with BDD or super Boolean matrix 
moduling approach transformation 
3 Data precision N/A Fuzzified basic events data 
4 Probability analysis Conventional Fuzzy approach probability approach 
Top event probability Use crisp data for the Use fuzzy data for the 
top event probability fuzzy top event 
estimation 
calculation probability calculation 
5 Most likely top event N/A Weighted average probability estimation defuzzification method 
Basic events FV importance, 6. importance Brinbaum' s importance, FWI 
criticality importance 
7 Cutsets impotance FV cutsets importance, Fuzzy based cutset importance 
8 Uncertainty analysis Normal probability Fuzzy approach 
approach 
6.2.2 COMPARISON USING RESULTS OF FTA 
PROFAT and the proposed methodology give more accurate analysis for a fault 
tree. For the case study, the top event probability estimated by PROFAT is 3.131E-04. 
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But this is found to be 2.954E-04 by the developed methodology, which is almost the 
same as the probability obtained by Wang et al. (2005). PROF AT uses the centroid 
method for the top event probability defuzzification, which estimates the top event 
probability by giving equal emphasis in all membership values. The current study 
attempts to revise this limitation of PROFAT by defuzzifying the top event probability 
with weighted average method, which calculates the top event probability for a fault tree 
by weighting each membership function in the output by its respective maximum 
membership value. Detailed comparison studies of all results are presented in Table 6.2. 
The remaining analysis of a fault tree (e.g., the number of minimal cutsets, important 
basic event and important cutsets) predicts the same results as PROFAT or Relax Fault 
Tree. 
Table 6.2: Results obtained for the case study using different approaches 
Approach Minimal Cutsets 
Proposed Algorithm (current work) 20 
PROFAT simulation 20 
Relax Fault Tree 20 
Approach Important Basic Event 
Proposed Algorithm (current work) BEI,BE3,BE4,BE6 
PROFAT simulation BE1,BE3,BE4,BE6 
Relax Fault Tree It has no module to estimate system sensitivity 
Approach Top Event Probability 
Proposed Algorithm (current work) 2.954E-04 
PROFAT simulation 3.131E-04 
Relax Fault Tree 2.892 E-04 
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6.2.3 COMPARISON USING UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Conventional FT A (Conventional probability approach) uses crisp data for the 
probability analysis of a fault tree. It is apparent that if the basic events data has some 
percentage of error in estimation, it ultimately accumulates in the top event probability 
calculation of a fault tree. Fuzzy FT A (Fuzzy probability approach) analysis attempts to 
recover this limitation by fuzzifying the crisp data of basic events to fuzzy data. These 
fuzzified basic events data give a trapezoidal fuzzy set for the top event, which minimizes 
the error during the top event probability calculation. The uncertainty analysis in section 
5.2 of the current study indicates that the fuzzy FTA (described methodology) gives a 
better result as compared to the conventional FTA (existing methodology), as even the 
basic events have error in their estimation. The results of the uncertainty analysis are 
shown in Figure 6.1. This figure depicts that the percentage of cumulative error in the top 
event probability, calculated by the conventional approach, increases abruptly with the 
increases of error in the basic events data. On the other hand, in the case of the proposed 
fuzzy FT A, the accumulation error on the top event probability appears to be negligible 
over the ranges of error in the basic events. 
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Figure 6.1: Error robustness of fuzzy FT A and conventional FT A 
SUMMARY 
The results obtained by simulating the case study with the proposed methodology 
have been discussed. The complete analysis of a fault tree for the case study provides a 
numerical evaluation for the top event probability calculation, as well as the system's 
weakest link, and weakest components detection. FT A helps to design a proper strategy 
to increase a system reliability and safety of a process facility. An uncertainty analysis 
has also been carried out to emphasize that the fuzzy based FT A handle imprecise basic 
events better compared to conventional fault tree analysis. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
FTA is widely used to assess the operational performance, reliability predictions, 
lifetime, and system safety of various complex systems as in a nuclear reactor, aerospace 
system, petrochemical industry, process industry, or oil and gas transmission system. 
Model and parameter uncertainties are the main barriers for achieving precise results 
from a fault tree. Fuzzy set theory used in Ff A attempts to remove these uncertainties 
from the conventional fault tree analysis. The proposed methodology is a revised version 
of the PROFAT algorithm, revisions aimed to improve fuzzy number characterization, 
fuzzy based top event probability calculation and uncertainty propagation. Further, the 
fuzzy weighted index and the cutsets importance measuring technique of this 
methodology provide valuable information about the basic event sensitivity, paths 
sensitivity and the probable scope for improving overall system performance. The 
following are the key features of the described methodology. 
Features in FTA methodology: 
• Ability to Handle Large and Complex trees: An efficient KHIC algorithm is 
used to modularize the fault tree into sub-trees. This is the key to handle large and 
complex fault trees. 
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• Adjustment of Data Uncertainty: The fuzzy model in the probability analysis 
module minimizes the uncertainty in the basic event data by distributing the error 
to a trapezoidal membership function. 
• Reliable Analysis: Basic event data fuzzification and fuzzy arithmetic operations 
in probability calculation assist to get a more realistic and reliable analysis (tilting 
towards the conservative side) of a complete fault tree. 
• Sensitivity Analysis: The two integrated features, i.e., fuzzy weighted index and 
cutsets importance, in sensitivity analysis give more robust predictions of a 
system reliability/failure probability. 
To illustrate the comparisons of fuzzy Ff A and conventional Ff A, an uncertainty 
analysis was carried out for estimating the cumulative error in the top event of a fault tree 
if the basic events have error in data estimation. The uncertainty analysis of the fuzzy 
based uncertainty quantification and its comparisons with the normal probabilistic 
uncertainty quantification have shown that this approach (fuzzy Ff A) is more realistic 
and robust to handle the imprecise basic event data of Ff A. 
Features of fuzzy approach in uncertainty analysis: 
• It distributes all basic event errors in the whole trapezoidal region and thus 
attempts to represent a more realistic scenario when the actual amounts of data 
uncertainty are not known with sufficient confidence. 
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• It could be computationally efficient, as it would avoid data eclipsing by dividing 
a complex fuzzy membership function into different regions and calculate error 
using these regions. 
7.2 FUTURE WORK 
This work proposes a fuzzy based computer-aided methodology for fault tree 
analysis. The following recommendations have been suggested for the future 
improvement of the proposed study: 
1. The fuzzy approach in this methodology is a new approach for the evaluation 
technique of Ff A. Hence, in order to make the methodology more reliable and 
competitive with the existing methodology, it is necessary that the evaluation 
strategy of Ff A in this study be properly compared and validated with the 
analysis of some more FT A case studies of process facilities. 
11. Conventional FT A cannot reflect the real situation of basic events data estimation, 
which is recovered in this study by using a fuzzy model for probability analysis of 
FT A. This model can be further modified by incorporating expertise elicitation 
criteria for evaluating the basic events data, more precisely. 
111. The present fault tree analysis is static in nature. Attempts need to be made to 
bring dynamic characteristics into fault tree analysis. This would help in carrying 
out time dependent analysis. 
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iv. The developed computer code in VISUAL BASIC needs further modification to 
make it more user friendly and reliable computer aided FT A tool for the process 
facility. Then, the developed methodology, along with the supporting tools of 
FT A, can be used to enhance the application of FT A tools in the risk analysis of 
the process facility. 
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APPENDIX A 
MODULES IDENTIFICATION OF A LARGE FAULT TREE 
Al: Fault tree diagram of ethylene release from ethylene vaporization unit (Hauptmanns, 1980) 
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Table Al.l: Basic events and its symbols in the fault tree (Hauptmanns, 1980) 
Basic events Name Symbols Basic event Name Symbols 
Pressure measurement P1 
fails X-1 S 1 fails closed X-24 
Valve positioner V1 fails X-2 S 1 fails open X-25 
Signal transmission P1-V1 
fails X-3 S 1 set point too high X-26 
V 1 fails closed X-4 S2 fails closed X-27 
V1 fails open X-5 S2 fails open X-28 
Valve positioner V2 fails X-6 S2 set point too high X-29 
Signal transmission P1-V2 
fails X-7 Ethylene pump fails X-30 
Spontaneous rupture of 
V2 fails closed X-8 deposit X-31 
Instrument air supply fails X-9 Pipe work fire X-32 
Temperature measurement T1 
fails X-10 External & secondary effects X-33 
Ethylene vaporizer 
Valve positioner V3 fails X-11 functioning X-34 
Signal transmission T1-V3 Pressure vaporizer not 
fails X-12 functioning X-35 
Pressure measurement P2 
fails X-13 Heater not functioning X-36 
Signal transmission P2-V3 X-14 Ethylene pump demanded X-37 
Flow measurement F1 fails X-15 Exit to process closed X-38 
Signal transmission F1-V3 
fails X-16 Exit to recompression closed X-39 
V3 fails closed X-17 No discharge via V2 X-40 
V3 fails open X-18 Pressurization via V 1 X-41 
Level measurement L1 fails X-19 Supply to deposit functioning X-42 
Signal transmission L1-V 4 
fails X-20 Exit temperature below -1 0°C X-43 
Exit manometric pressure > 
Valve positioner V 4 fails X-21 16.18 bar X-44 
V 4 fails closed X-22 Exit flow > demand X-45 
Deposit manometric pressure 
V 4 fails open X-23 < 1.96 bar X-46 
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Table A 1.2: Connection list of the large fault tree 
SI. No. Gate event Gate type Connected events 
1 G1 OR G2 X-31 X-32 
2 G2 AND G3 G4 G5 
3 G3 OR G6 G7 X-32 
4 G6 AND G10 X-35 
5 G10 OR G14 X-5 
6 G14 AND G17 X-9 X-4 
7 G17 AND G19 X-46 
8 G19 AND X-1 X-2 X-32 
9 G7 AND G11 G12 
10 G11 AND X-30 X-37 
11 G12 OR G15 X-9 X-17 
12 G15 AND G18 X-9 X-17 
13 G18 OR G20 G21 G22 
14 G20 AND G23 X-43 
15 G23 AND X-10 X-11 X-12 
16 G21 AND G24 X-44 
17 G24 AND X-11 X-13 X-14 
18 G22 AND G25 G45 
19 G25 AND X-11 X-15 X-16 
20 G4 OR X-24 X-26 
21 G5 OR G8 G9 X-40 
22 G8 AND G13 X-40 X-9 
23 G13 OR G16 X-8 
24 G16 OR X-1 X-6 X-7 
25 G9 AND X-40 X-9 
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Table Al. 3: Identified modules and Minimal cutsets for the fault tree 
Modules Minimal Cutsets Cutsets in Each Module 
013 (016) (X-8) 4 
(X-21) (X-6) (X-7) (X-8) 
04 (X-24) (X-26) 2 
022 (025, X-45) 
(X-15, X-11, X-16, X-45) 1 
021 (024, X-43) 
(X-13, X-11, X-14, X-44) 1 
020 (023, X-43) 
(X-10, X-11, X-12, X-43) 1 
018 (020) (021) (022) 3 
011 (X-30, X-37) 1 
07 (011, 012) 
[(X-30, X-37), (015), (X-9), (X-17)] 
[(X-30, X-37), (018, X-9, X-17), (X-9), (X-17)] 
[(X-30, X-37), [(020)(021)(022), (X-9), (X-17)], X-9, X- 5 
17], 
017 (019, X-46) 
(X-1, X-2, X-3, X-46) 1 
010 (014) (X-5) 
(017, X-9, X-4)(X-5) 2 
06 (010, X-35) 2 
03 (06) (07) (X-32) 8 
02 (ill, 04, 05) 78 
01 (02) (X-31) (X-33) 80 
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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS BY PROF AT TOOL 
Bl: MCSs determination by PROF AT tool for the case study 
PROFAT (PRObability FAult Tree analysis) 
F.I.Khan & S.A.Abbasi - Pondicherry 605014 
1 
2 
MINIMAL PATH WAYS 
3 6 
4 6 
5 6 
3 7 8 9 
3 12 14 
4 7 8 9 
4 12 14 
5 7 8 9 
5 12 14 
3 7 8 10 
3 7 8 11 
3 13 14 
4 7 8 10 
4 7 8 11 
4 13 14 
5 7 8 10 
5 7 8 11 
5 13 14 
N.B: PROF AT uses 1, 2, 3 ......... nfor the basic events labeling of a fault tree. 
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B2: Probability analysis by PROF AT tool for the case study 
PROFAT (PRObability FAult Tree analysis} 
F.I.Khan & S.A.Abbasi - Pondicherry 605014 
PROBABILITY/ 
FREQUENCY (/yr) 
1.000000e-04 
O.OOOOOOe+OO 
1.689050e-05 
1.895094e-04 
2.543750e-06 
4.033072e-11 
2.447877e-07 
4.525058e-10 
2.746489e-06 
6.073904e-12 
3.686562e-08 
2.180039e-08 
7.532036e-08 
9.057148e-09 
2.445977e-07 
8.450853e-07 
1.016201e-07 
3.283191e-09 
1.134343e-08 
MINIMAL PATH WAY 
(Event Numbers) 
1 
2 
3 6 
4 6 
5 6 
3 7 8 9 
3 12 14 
4 7 8 9 
4 12 14 
5 7 8 9 
5 12 14 
3 7 8 10 
3 7 8 11 
3 13 14 
4 7 8 10 
4 7 8 11 
4 13 14 
5 7 8 10 
5 7 8 11 
Total Probability: 3.132844e-04 
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B3: Fuzzy based probability analysis by PROF AT tool for the case study 
PROFAT (PRObability FAult Tree analysis) 
F.I.Khan & S.A.Abbasi - Pondicherry 605014 
IMPROVEMENT INDEX RESULTS 
Event not- Probability Improvement Improvement 
occuring Index 
0 3.131777e-04 O.OOOOOOe+OO 0.000000 
1 2.131909e-04 3.999473e-04 18.797096 
2 3.131628e-04 5.966285e-08 0.002804 
3 2.958924e-04 6.914145e-05 3.249575 
4 1.197904e-04 7.735491e-04 36.355988 
5 3.106445e-04 1.013288e-05 0.476235 
6 1.042634e-04 8.356571e-04 39.274998 
7 3.120005e-04 4.708869e-06 0.221312 
8 3.120005e-04 4.708869e-06 0.221312 
9 3.131628e-04 5.966285e-08 0.002804 
10 3.129095e-04 1.073029e-06 0.050431 
11 3.122538e-04 3.695532e-06 0.173686 
12 3.101379e-04 1.215933e-05 0.571476 
13 3.130883e-04 3.576279e-07 0.016808 
14 3.100634e-04 1.245744e-05 0.5854877 
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APPENDIXC 
UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Cl: 5% ERROR IN BASIC EVENTS 
Cl.l Uncertainty analysis for conventional probability approach 
Table Cl.l: MiniTab output 
Variable N 
Top event 8000 
Mean SE Mean StDev Median 
0.0002926 0.000000707 0.0000632 0.000289 
C1.2 Uncertainty analysis for fuzzy probability approach 
Table C1.2.1: Fuzzy probability with -5.0% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with -5% error Probability ("around') (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
PBEI 9.500E-05 4.750E-05 7.125E-05 1.188E-04 
PsE2 9.500E-08 4.750E-08 7.125E-08 1.188E-07 
PBE3 6.308E-04 3.154E-04 4.731E-04 7.885E-04 
PBE4 7.078E-03 3.539E-03 5.308E-03 8.847E-03 
PBE5 9.500E-05 4.750E-05 7.125E-05 1.188E-04 
PsE6 2.090E-02 1.045E-02 1.568E-02 2.613E-02 
PsE7 7.914E-02 3.957E-02 5.935E-02 9.892E-02 
PsEs 9.500E-03 4.750E-03 7.125E-03 1.188E-02 
PsE9 3.515E-05 1.758E-05 2.636E-05 4.394E-05 
PsEIO 1.900E-02 9.500E-03 1.425E-02 2.375E-02 
PsEll 6.565E-02 3.282E-02 4.923E-02 8.206E-02 
PBE12 9.500E-04 4.750E-04 7.125E-04 1.188E-03 
PBE13 3.515E-05 1.758E-05 2.636E-05 4.394E-05 
PsEI4 2.385E-01 1.192E-01 1.788E-Ol 2.981E-Ol 
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1.425E-04 
1.425E-07 
9.462E-04 
1.062E-02 
1.425E-04 
3.135E-02 
1.187E-Ol 
1.425E-02 
5.273E-05 
2.850E-02 
9.847E-02 
1.425E-03 
5.273E-05 
3.577E-Ol 
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Table C1.2.2: Fuzzy probability of MCSs ( -5% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 4.750E-05 7.125E-05 1.188E-04 1.425E-04 
BE2 4.750E-08 7.125E-08 1.188E-07 1.425E-07 
BE3 BE6 3.296E-06 7.416E-06 2.060E-05 2.966E-05 
BE4 BE6 3.698E-05 8.320E-05 2.311E-04 3.328E-04 
BE5 BE6 4.964E-07 l.ll?E-06 3.102E-06 4.467E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.042E-12 5.274E-12 4.070E-ll 8.439E-11 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.169E-ll 5.918E-ll 4.566E-10 9.468E-10 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.569E-13 7.943E-13 6.129E-12 1.271E-ll 
BE3 BE12 BE14 1.786E-08 6.028E-08 2.791E-07 4.823E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 2.004E-07 6.764E-07 3.131E-06 5.4llE-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 2.690E-09 9.079E-09 4.203E-08 7.263E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEIO 5.631E-10 2.851E-09 2.200E-08 4.561E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 6.318E-09 3.199E-08 2.468E-07 5.ll8E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 8.481E-11 4.294E-10 3.313E-09 6.870E-09 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.946E-09 9.850E-09 7.600E-08 1.576E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 2.183E-08 1.105E-07 8.527E-07 1.768E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 2.930E-10 1.483E-09 1.145E-08 2.373E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 6.609E-10 2.230E-09 1.033E-08 1.784E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 7.415E-09 2.503E-08 1.159E-07 2.002E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 9.953E-11 3.359E-10 1.555E-09 2.687E-09 
Table C1.2.3: Fuzzy probability with 5.0% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with 5% error Probability ("around') (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
PsEI l.OSOE-04 5.250E-05 7.875E-05 1.313E-04 1.575E-04 
PsE2 l.OSOE-07 5.250E-08 7.875E-08 1.313E-07 1.575E-07 
PBE3 6.972E-04 3.486E-04 5.229E-04 8.715E-04 1.046E-03 
PsE4 7.823E-03 3.9llE-03 5.867E-03 9.778E-03 1.173E-02 
PBES l.OSOE-04 5.250E-05 7.875E-05 1.313E-04 1.575E-04 
PBE6 2.310E-02 1.155E-02 1.733E-02 2.888E-02 3.465E-02 
PBE7 8.747E-02 4.373E-02 6.560E-02 1.093E-Ol 1.312E-Ol 
PBE8 l.OSOE-02 5.250E-03 7.875E-03 1.313E-02 1.575E-02 
PBE9 3.885E-05 1.943E-05 2.914E-05 4.856E-05 5.828E-05 
PBEIO 2.100E-02 l.OSOE-02 1.575E-02 2.625E-02 3.150E-02 
PBEll 7.256E-02 3.628E-02 5.442E-02 9.069E-02 1.088E-Ol 
PBEI2 l.OSOE-03 5.250E-04 7.875E-04 1.313E-03 1.575E-03 
PBE13 3.885E-05 1.943E-05 2.914E-05 4.856E-05 5.828E-05 
PBEI4 2.636E-Ol 1.318E-Ol 1.977E-Ol 3.294E-Ol 3.953E-Ol 
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Table C1.2.4: Fuzzy probability ofMCSs (5% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,Pm, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 5.250E-05 7.875E-05 1.313E-04 1.575E-04 
BE2 5.250E-08 7.875E-08 1.313E-07 1.575E-07 
BE3 BE6 4.026E-06 9.059E-06 2.516E-05 3.624E-05 
BE4 BE6 4.517E-05 1.016E-04 2.823E-04 4.066E-04 
BE5 BE6 6.064E-07 1.364E-06 3.790E-06 5.457E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.555E-12 7.871E-12 6.073E-ll 1.259E-10 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.744E-ll 8.831E-ll 6.814E-10 1.413E-09 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.341E-13 1.185E-12 9.146E-12 1.897E-ll 
BE3 BE12 BE14 2.412E-08 8.139E-08 3.768E-07 6.512E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 2.706E-07 9.132E-07 4.228E-06 7.306E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 3.632E-09 1.226E-08 5.675E-08 9.807E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 8.404E-10 4.254E-09 3.283E-08 6.807E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 9.429E-09 4.773E-08 3.683E-07 7.638E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.266E-10 6.407E-10 4.944E-09 1.025E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 2.904E-09 1.470E-08 1.134E-07 2.352E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 3.258E-08 1.649E-07 1.273E-06 2.639E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 4.373E-10 2.214E-09 1.708E-08 3.542E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 8.923E-10 3.012E-09 1.394E-08 2.409E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 l.OOlE-08 3.379E-08 1.564E-07 2.703E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 1.344E-10 4.536E-10 2.100E-09 3.628E-09 
Table C1.2.5: Top event probability with 5 % error in basic events 
Fuzzy probability PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) Pn(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.027E-04 1.922E-04 4.493E-04 6.179E-04 (5.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 8.858E-05 1.640E-04 3.785E-04 5.182E-04 (-5.0% error) 
Most likely Top Event 2.959E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892 E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-2.3% (approximately) 
event 
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Table C1.2.6: Fuzzy top event probability calculated by the random samples (5 % error 
in basic events) 
Number of random samples: 8000 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.199E-04 2.021E-04 4.568E-04 (5.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 9.393E-05 1.592E-04 3.627E-04 ( -5.0% error) 
Most likely Top Event 2.952E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892 E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-2.3% (approximately) 
event 
C2: 10% ERROR IN BASIC EVENTS 
C2.1 Uncertainty analysis for conventional probability approach 
Table C2.1: MiniTab output 
Variable N Mean SE Mean StDev Median 
Top event 8000 0.000324 0.00000104 0.000104 0.000308 
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C2.2 Uncertainty analysis for fuzzy probability approach 
Table C2.2.1: Fuzzy probability with -10.0% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with -10% error Probability ("around') (PiA,Pm, Pic, Pm) 
Psm 9.000E-05 4.500E-05 6.750E-05 1.125E-04 1.350E-04 
PBE2 9.000E-08 4.500E-08 6.750E-08 1.125E-07 1.350E-07 
PsE3 5.976E-04 2.988E-04 4.482E-04 7.470E-04 8.964E-04 
PsE4 6.705E-03 3.353E-03 5.029E-03 8.381E-03 1.006E-02 
PsEs 9.000E-05 4.500E-05 6.750E-05 1.125E-04 1.350E-04 
PBE6 1.980E-02 9.900E-03 1.485E-02 2.475E-02 2.970E-02 
PsE7 7.497E-02 3.749E-02 5.623E-02 9.371E-02 1.125E-01 
PBE8 9.000E-03 4.500E-03 6.750E-03 1.125E-02 1.350E-02 
PsE9 3.330E-05 1.665E-05 2.498E-05 4.163E-05 4.995E-05 
PsE!O 1.800E-02 9.000E-03 1.350E-02 2.250E-02 2.700E-02 
PBEII 6.219E-02 3.llOE-02 4.664E-02 7.774E-02 9.329E-02 
PBE12 9.000E-04 4.500E-04 6.750E-04 1.125E-03 1.350E-03 
PBE13 3.330E-05 1.665E-05 2.498E-05 4.163E-05 4.995E-05 
PBE14 2.259E-Ol 1.130E-Ol 1.694E-01 2.824E-01 3.389E-Ol 
Table C2.2.2: Fuzzy probability of MCSs (-1 0% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,Pm, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 4.500E-05 6.750E-05 1.125E-04 1.350E-04 
BE2 4.500E-08 6.750E-08 1.125E-07 1.350E-07 
BE3 BE6 2.958E-06 6.656E-06 1.849E-05 2.662E-05 
BE4 BE6 3.319E-05 7.468E-05 2.074E-04 2.987E-04 
BE5 BE6 4.455E-07 1.002E-06 2.784E-06 4.010E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 8.392E-13 4.248E-12 3.278E-11 6.798E-11 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 9.416E-12 4.767E-ll 3.678E-10 7.627E-10 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.264E-13 6.398E-13 4.937E-12 1.024E-ll 
BE3 BE12 BE14 1.519E-08 5.126E-08 2.373E-07 4.101E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 1.704E-07 5.751E-07 2.662E-06 4.601E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 2.287E-09 7.719E-09 3.574E-08 6.176E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 4.536E-10 2.296E-09 1.772E-08 3.674E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 5.090E-09 2.577E-08 1.988E-07 4.123E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 6.832E-11 3.459E-10 2.669E-09 5.534E-09 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.567E-09 7.934E-09 6.122E-08 1.269E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.758E-08 8.902E-08 6.869E-07 1.424E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 2.360E-10 1.195E-09 9.220E-09 1.912E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 5.619E-10 1.897E-09 8.780E-09 1.517E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 6.305E-09 2.128E-08 9.851E-08 1.702E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 8.463E-11 2.856E-10 1.322E-09 2.285E-09 
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Table C2.2.3: Fuzzy probability with 10.0% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with 10% error Probability ("around') (PiA,Prn, Pic, Pm) 
PBEI l.lOOE-04 5.500E-05 8.250E-05 1.375E-04 1.650E-04 
PBE2 l.lOOE-07 5.500E-08 8.250E-08 1.375E-07 1.650E-07 
PBE3 7.304E-04 3.652E-04 5.478E-04 9.130E-04 1.096E-03 
PBE4 8.195E-03 4.098E-03 6.146E-03 1.024E-02 1.229E-02 
PBE5 l.lOOE-04 5.500E-05 8.250E-05 1.375E-04 1.650E-04 
PBE6 2.420E-02 1.210E-02 1.815E-02 3.025E-02 3.630E-02 
PBE7 9.163E-02 4.582E-02 6.872E-02 1.145E-Ol 1.374E-01 
PBE8 l.lOOE-02 5.500E-03 8.250E-03 1.375E-02 1.650E-02 
PBE9 4.070E-05 2.035E-05 3.053E-05 5.088E-05 6.105E-05 
PBEIO 2.200E-02 l.lOOE-02 1.650E-02 2.750E-02 3.300E-02 
PBEII 7.601E-02 3.801E-02 5.701E-02 9.501E-02 1.140E-Ol 
PBE12 l.lOOE-03 5.500E-04 8.250E-04 1.375E-03 1.650E-03 
PBE13 4.070E-05 2.035E-05 3.053E-05 5.088E-05 6.105E-05 
PBE14 2.761E-01 1.381E-01 2.071E-Ol 3.451E-01 4.142E-Ol 
Table C2.2.4: Fuzzy probability of MCSs (10% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,Prn, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 5.500E-05 8.250E-05 1.375E-04 1.650E-04 
BE2 5.500E-08 8.250E-08 1.375E-07 1.650E-07 
BE3 BE6 4.419E-06 9.943E-06 2.762E-05 3.977E-05 
BE4 BE6 4.958E-05 l.ll6E-04 3.099E-04 4.462E-04 
BE5 BE6 6.655E-07 1.497E-06 4.159E-06 5.990E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.873E-12 9.480E-12 7.315E-ll 1.517E-10 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.101E-ll 1.064E-10 8.208E-10 1.702E-09 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.820E-13 1.428E-12 1.102E-ll 2.284E-ll 
BE3 BE12 BE14 2.773E-08 9.358E-08 4.333E-07 7.487E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 3.1llE-07 l.OSOE-06 4.861E-06 8.400E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 4.176E-09 1.409E-08 6.525E-08 1.128E-07 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.012E-09 5.125E-09 3.954E-08 8.199E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.136E-08 5.750E-08 4.437E-07 9.200E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.524E-10 7.718E-10 5.955E-09 1.235E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 3.497E-09 1.771E-08 1.366E-07 2.833E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 3.924E-08 1.987E-07 1.533E-06 3.178E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 5.267E-10 2.666E-09 2.057E-08 4.266E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 1.026E-09 3.463E-09 1.603E-08 2.770E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 1.151E-08 3.885E-08 1.799E-07 3.108E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 1.545E-10 5.215E-10 2.414E-09 4.172E-09 
111 
Appendix C 
Table C2.2.5: Top event probability with 10 % error in basic events 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) Po(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.101E-04 2.070E-04 4.870E-04 6.712E-04 (10.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 8.186E-05 1.507E-04 3.453E-04 4.717E-04 (-10.0% error) 
Most likely top event 2.975E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-2.87% (approximately) 
event 
Table C2.2.6: Fuzzy top event probability calculated by the random samples (10% error 
in basic events) 
Number of random samples: 8000 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) Po(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.255E-04 2.270E-04 4.940E-04 6.382E-04 (10.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 7.878E-05 1.460E-04 3.174E-04 4.101E-04 (-10.0% error) 
Most likely top event 2.961E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-3.13% (approximately) 
event 
C3: 15% ERROR IN BASIC EVENTS 
C3.1 Uncertainty analysis for conventional probability approach 
Table C3.1: MiniTab output 
Variable N Mean SE Mean StDev Median 
Top event 8000 0.000348 0.00000135 0.000121 0.0003001 
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C3.2. Uncertainty analysis for fuzzy probability approach 
Table C3.2.1: Fuzzy probability with -15% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with -15% error Probability ("around') (PiA,Pm, Pic, PiD) 
PBEI 8.500E-05 4.250E-05 6.375E-05 1.063E-04 1.275E-04 
PBE2 8.500E-08 4.250E-08 6.375E-08 1.063E-07 1.275E-07 
PBE3 5.644E-04 2.822E-04 4.233E-04 7.055E-04 8.466E-04 
PBE4 6.333E-03 3.166E-03 4.749E-03 7.916E-03 9.499E-03 
PBE5 8.500E-05 4.250E-05 6.375E-05 1.063E-04 1.275E-04 
PBE6 1.870E-02 9.350E-03 1.403E-02 2.338E-02 2.805E-02 
PBE7 7.081E-02 3.540E-02 5.310E-02 8.851E-02 1.062E-Ol 
PBE8 8.500E-03 4.250E-03 6.375E-03 1.063E-02 1.275E-02 
PBE9 3.145E-05 1.573E-05 2.359E-05 3.931E-05 4.718E-05 
PBEIO 1.700E-02 8.500E-03 1.275E-02 2.125E-02 2.550E-02 
PBEII 5.874E-02 2.937E-02 4.405E-02 7.342E-02 8.810E-02 
PBE12 8.500E-04 4.250E-04 6.375E-04 1.063E-03 1.275E-03 
PBE13 3.145E-05 1.573E-05 2.359E-05 3.931E-05 4.718E-05 
PBE14 2.134E-Ol 1.067E-01 1.600E-Ol 2.667E-Ol 3.200E-01 
Table C3.2.2: Fuzzy probability of MCSs (-15% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,Prn, Pic, PiD) 
BEl 4.250E-05 6.375E-05 1.063E-04 1.275E-04 
BE2 4.250E-08 6.375E-08 1.063E-07 1.275E-07 
BE3 BE6 2.639E-06 5.937E-06 1.649E-05 2.375E-05 
BE4 BE6 2.960E-05 6.661E-05 1.850E-04 2.664E-04 
BE5 BE6 3.974E-07 8.941E-07 2.484E-06 3.576E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 6.677E-13 3.380E-12 2.608E-11 5.408E-11 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 7.491E-12 3.792E-11 2.926E-10 6.068E-10 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 1.006E-13 5.091E-13 3.928E-12 8.145E-12 
BE3 BE12 BE14 1.279E-08 4.318E-08 1.999E-07 3.454E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 1.435E-07 4.845E-07 2.243E-06 3.876E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 1.927E-09 6.503E-09 3.011E-08 5.202E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 3.609E-10 1.827E-09 1.410E-08 2.923E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 4.049E-09 2.050E-08 1.582E-07 3.280E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 5.435E-11 2.752E-10 2.123E-09 4.403E-09 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.247E-09 6.313E-09 4.871E-08 l.OlOE-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.399E-08 7.083E-08 5.465E-07 1.133E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.878E-10 9.507E-10 7.336E-09 1.521E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 4.734E-10 1.598E-09 7.397E-09 1.278E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 5.3llE-09 1.793E-08 8.299E-08 1.434E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 7.129E-ll 2.406E-10 l.ll4E-09 1.925E-09 
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Table C3.2.3: Fuzzy probability with 15 %error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with 15% error Probability ("around') (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
PsEI l.lSOE-04 5.750E-05 8.625E-05 1.438E-04 1:725E-04 
PBE2 l.lSOE-07 5.750E-08 8.625E-08 1.438E-07 1.725E-07 
PsE3 7.636E-04 3.818E-04 5.727E-04 9.545E-04 1.145E-03 
PsE4 8.568E-03 4.284E-03 6.426E-03 1.071E-02 1.285E-02 
PsE5 l.lSOE-04 5.750E-05 8.625E-05 1.438E-04 1.725E-04 
PsE6 2.530E-02 1.265E-02 1.898E-02 3.163E-02 3.795E-02 
PsE7 9.580E-02 4.790E-02 7.185E-02 1.197E-01 1.437E-Ol 
PsEs l.lSOE-02 5.750E-03 8.625E-03 1.438E-02 1.725E-02 
PBE9 4.255E-05 2.128E-05 3.191E-05 5.319E-05 6.383E-05 
PBEIO 2.300E-02 l.lSOE-02 1.725E-02 2.875E-02 3.450E-02 
PBEll 7.947E-02 3.973E-02 5.960E-02 9.933E-02 1.192E-01 
PsE12 l.lSOE-03 5.750E-04 8.625E-04 1.438E-03 1.725E-03 
Psm3 4.255E-05 2.128E-05 3.191E-05 5.319E-05 6.383E-05 
PBE14 2.887E-Ol 1.443E-01 2.165E-01 3.608E-Ol 4.330E-01 
Table C3.2.4: Fuzzy probability of MCSs (15% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 5.750E-05 8.625E-05 1.438E-04 1.725E-04 
BE2 5.750E-08 8.625E-08 1.438E-07 1.725E-07 
BE3 BE6 4.830E-06 1.087E-05 3.019E-05 4.347E-05 
BE4 BE6 5.419E-05 1.219E-04 3.387E-04 4.877E-04 
BE5 BE6 7.274E-07 1.637E-06 4.546E-06 6.546E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.237E-12 1.133E-ll 8.739E-11 1.812E-10 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.510E-ll 1.271E-10 9.805E-10 2.033E-09 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 3.369E-13 1.706E-12 1.316E-ll 2.729E-11 
BE3 BE12 BE14 3.168E-08 1.069E-07 4.951E-07 8.555E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 3.555E-07 1.200E-06 5.555E-06 9.598E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 4.772E-09 1.610E-08 7.456E-08 1.288E-07 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.209E-09 6.122E-09 4.724E-08 9.795E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.357E-08 6.869E-08 5.300E-07 1.099E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.821E-10 9.220E-10 7.ll4E-09 1.475E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 4.178E-09 2.ll5E-08 1.632E-07 3.384E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 4.688E-08 2.373E-07 1.831E-06 3.797E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 6.292E-10 3.185E-09 2.458E-08 5.097E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 1.172E-09 3.957E-09 1.832E-08 3.165E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 1.315E-08 4.439E-08 2.055E-07 3.551E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 1.766E-10 5.959E-10 2.759E-09 4.767E-09 
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Table C3.2.5: Top event probability with 15 % error in basic events 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) Po(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.178E-04 2.225E-04 5.262E-04 7.266E-04 (15.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 7.537E-05 1.379E-04 3.137E-04 4.274E-04 ( -15.0% error) 
Most likely top event 2.985E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-3.22% (approximately) 
event 
Table C3.2.6: Fuzzy top event probability calculated by the random samples (15% error 
in basic events) 
Number of random samples: 8000 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) Po(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.255E-04 2.365E-04 4.961E-04 6.382E-04 (15.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 8.474E-05 1.414E-04 3.273E-04 4.009E-04 (-15.0% error) 
Most likely top event 3.001E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-3.77% (approximately) 
event 
C4: 20% ERROR IN BASIC EVENTS 
C4.1 Uncertainty analysis for conventional probability approach 
Table C4.1: MiniTab output 
Variable N Mean SE Mean StDev Median 
Top event 8000 0.000463 0.00000315 0.000282 0.000528 
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C4.2 Uncertainty analysis for fuzzy probability approach 
Table C4.2.1: Fuzzy probability with -20% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with -20% error Probability ("around') (PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
PBEI S.OOOE-05 4.000E-05 6.000E-05 l.OOOE-04 1.200E-04 
PBE2 S.OOOE-08 4.000E-08 6.000E-08 l.OOOE-07 1.200E-07 
PBE3 5.312E-04 2.656E-04 3.984E-04 6.640E-04 7.968E-04 
PBE4 5.960E-03 2.980E-03 4.470E-03 7.450E-03 8.940E-03 
PBE5 S.OOOE-05 4.000E-05 6.000E-05 l.OOOE-04 1.200E-04 
PBE6 1.760E-02 8.800E-03 1.320E-02 2.200E-02 2.640E-02 
PBE7 6.664E-02 3.332E-02 4.998E-02 8.330E-02 9.996E-02 
PBE8 S.OOOE-03 4.000E-03 6.000E-03 l.OOOE-02 1.200E-02 
PBE9 2.960E-05 1.480E-05 2.220E-05 3.700E-05 4.440E-05 
PBEIO 1.600E-02 S.OOOE-03 1.200E-02 2.000E-02 2.400E-02 
PBEII 5.528E-02 2.764E-02 4.146E-02 6.910E-02 8.292E-02 
PBE12 S.OOOE-04 4.000E-04 6.000E-04 l.OOOE-03 1.200E-03 
PBEI3 2.960E-05 1.480E-05 2.220E-05 3.700E-05 4.440E-05 
PBE14 2.008E-Ol 1.004E-Ol 1.506E-01 2.510E-01 3.012E-Ol 
Table C4.2.2: Fuzzy probability of MCSs ( -20% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations PiA,PiB, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 4.000E-05 6.000E-05 l.OOOE-04 1.200E-04 
BE2 4.000E-08 6.000E-08 l.OOOE-07 1.200E-07 
BE3 BE6 2.337E-06 5.259E-06 1.461E-05 2.104E-05 
BE4 BE6 2.622E-05 5.900E-05 1.639E-04 2.360E-04 
BE5 BE6 3.520E-07 7.920E-07 2.200E-06 3.168E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 5.239E-13 2.652E-12 2.047E-ll 4.244E-ll 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 5.878E-12 2.976E-11 2.296E-10 4.761E-10 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 7.890E-14 3.994E-13 3.082E-12 6.391E-12 
BE3 BE12 BE14 1.067E-08 3.600E-08 1.667E-07 2.880E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 1.197E-07 4.039E-07 1.870E-06 3.231E-06 
BE5 BE12 BE14 1.606E-09 5.422E-09 2.510E-08 4.337E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEIO 2.832E-10 1.434E-09 1.106E-08 2.294E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEIO 3.177E-09 1.609E-08 1.241E-07 2.574E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEIO 4.265E-ll 2.159E-10 1.666E-09 3.455E-09 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 9.784E-10 4.953E-09 3.822E-08 7.925E-08 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.098E-08 5.558E-08 4.288E-07 8.892E-07 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BEll 1.474E-10 7.460E-10 5.756E-09 1.194E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 3.947E-10 1.332E-09 6.167E-09 1.066E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 4.428E-09 1.494E-08 6.919E-08 1.196E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 5.944E-11 2.006E-10 9.287E-10 1.605E-09 
116 
Appendix C 
Table C4.2.3: Fuzzy probability with 20% error in basic events data 
Fuzzy Fuzzy Number Trapezoidal representations 
with 20% error Probability ("around') (PiA,Pm, Pic, Pm) 
PnEI 1.200E-04 6.000E-05 9.000E-05 l.SOOE-04 l.SOOE-04 
PBE2 1.200E-07 6.000E-08 9.000E-08 l.SOOE-07 l.SOOE-07 
PnE3 7.968E-04 3.984E-04 5.976E-04 9.960E-04 1.195E-03 
PBE4 8.940E-03 4.470E-03 6.705E-03 l.llSE-02 1.341E-02 
PBE5 1.200E-04 6.000E-05 9.000E-05 l.SOOE-04 l.SOOE-04 
PBE6 2.640E-02 1.320E-02 1.980E-02 3.300E-02 3.960E-02 
Pnm 9.996E-02 4.998E-02 7.497E-02 1.250E-01 1.499E-01 
PnEs 1.200E-02 6.000E-03 9.000E-03 l.SOOE-02 l.SOOE-02 
PnE9 4.440E-05 2.220E-05 3.330E-05 5.550E-05 6.660E-05 
PnEio 2.400E-02 1.200E-02 l.SOOE-02 3.000E-02 3.600E-02 
PBEII 8.292E-02 4.146E-02 6.219E-02 1.037E-01 1.244E-01 
PBE12 1.200E-03 6.000E-04 9.000E-04 l.SOOE-03 l.SOOE-03 
PBE13 4.440E-05 2.220E-05 3.330E-05 5.550E-05 6.660E-05 
PnEI4 3.012E-01 1.506E-01 2.259E-01 3.765E-Ol 4.518E-01 
Table C4.2.1.4: Fuzzy probability of MCSs (20% error in basic events) 
MCSs Trapezoidal representations (PiA,Pm, Pic, Pm) 
BEl 6.000E-05 9.000E-05 1.500E-04 l.SOOE-04 
BE2 6.000E-08 9.000E-08 l.SOOE-07 l.SOOE-07 
BE3 BE6 5.259E-06 1.183E-05 3.287E-05 4.733E-05 
BE4 BE6 5.900E-05 1.328E-04 3.688E-04 5.310E-04 
BE5 BE6 7.920E-07 1.782E-06 4.950E-06 7.128E-06 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.652E-12 1.343E-ll 1.036E-10 2.148E-10 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BE9 2.976E-ll 1.507E-10 1.162E-09 2.410E-09 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BE9 3.994E-13 2.022E-12 1.560E-ll 3.235E-ll 
BE3 BE12 BE14 3.600E-08 1.215E-07 5.625E-07 9.720E-07 
BE4 BE12 BE14 4.039E-07 1.363E-06 6.311E-06 1.091E-05 
BE5 BE12 BE14 5.422E-09 1.830E-08 8.471E-08 1.464E-07 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.434E-09 7.258E-09 5.600E-08 1.161E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BElO 1.609E-08 8.143E-08 6.283E-07 1.303E-06 
BE5 BE7 BE8 BElO 2.159E-10 1.093E-09 8.434E-09 1.749E-08 
BE3 BE7 BE8 BEll 4.953E-09 2.508E-08 1.935E-07 4.012E-07 
BE4 BE7 BE8 BEll 5.558E-08 2.814E-07 2.171E-06 4.502E-06 
BES BE7 BE8 BEll 7.460E-10 3.777E-09 2.914E-08 6.042E-08 
BE3 BE13 BE14 1.332E-09 4.495E-09 2.081E-08 3.596E-08 
BE4 BE13 BE14 1.494E-08 5.044E-08 2.335E-07 4.035E-07 
BE5 BE13 BE14 2.006E-10 6.770E-10 3.134E-09 5.416E-09 
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Table C4.2.5: Top event probability with 20 % error in basic events 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) PD(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.257E-04 2.384E-04 5.670E-04 7.844E-04 (20.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 6.910E-05 1.257E-04 2.835E-04 3.853E-04 (-20.0% error) 
Most likely top event 3.036E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892 E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-5% (approximately) 
event 
Table C4.2.6: Fuzzy top event probability calculated by the random samples (20% error 
in basic events) 
Number of random samples: 8000 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pc(T) PD(T) 
analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.255E-04 2.270E-04 4.940E-04 6.382E-04 (20.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 8.327E-05 1.543E-04 3.355E-04 4.335E-04 ( -20.0% error) 
Most likely top event 3.027E-04 
Exact top event probability 2.892E-04 
Percentage of error on top-
-4.75% (approximately) 
event 
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CS: a-CUT METHOD FOR UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
The concept of a-cuts can also be another approach for checking the cumulating 
error on top-event of a fault tree besides the two approaches used in this study. The 
following example for specific a-level is also proving that this approach gives the same 
results as the fuzzy uncertainty analysis approach developed in the study. 
Example: 
For implementing a-cut concept in uncertainty analyses at first consider a specific 
membership grade or a value, which is 0.75 for all basic events trapezoidal membership 
function. The corresponding four-tuple (PiA, PiB, Pic, PiD) values for basic events data are 
calculated by using equation 4.3. Usually a grade value can be any value between 0 to 1. 
As for example here the concept is applied for estimating cumulating error on top-event if 
the basic events have 15% error. 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
------ !1_ :;=_ Q}.~ 
0 +-----------~-L+---,-~~L---~~-----, 
0 PiA(a)Pia(l) Pdl) PiD(a) 
Probability of failure 
Figure: Trapezoidal representation of basic event probability with a-cut 
Procedure of uncertainty analysis with a-cuts 
1. Consider± 15% error in basic events data. 
2. Fuzzyfying the basic events data and calculating the corresponding a-cut values 
[PiA( a), PiB(1), Pic(l), PiD(a)] using the membership equation.[Using equation 4.3] 
3. Calculating the all cutsets probability and Fuzzy top-event probability of the fault 
tree using fuzzy arithmetic rules. [Using equation 4.6,4.7 and 4.8] 
4. Calculating most likely top event probability using weighted average 
defuzzification method. [Using equation 4.9] 
5. Calculating the cumulative error in the top event. 
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The summary table for the calculation of implementation of a-cut in uncertainty analysis 
has shown in Table C5.1. Table C5.2 shows the results obtained by using fuzzy 
uncertainty model developed in the study. These two tables actually show that the 
cumulating error on top event is nearly same for both approaches (a-cut concept and 
fuzzy uncertainty approach) if the basic events data has± 15% error. 
Table C 5.1: Top event probability with 15 %error in basic events (using a-cut concept) 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pcm Pnm analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.933E-04 2.224E-04 5.261E-04 5.732E-04 (15.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 1.207E-04 1.379E-04 3.136E-04 3.404E-04 (-15.0% error) 
Most likely top event 2.993E-04 
Exact top event 2.892E-04 probability 
Percentage of error on 
-3.49% (approximately) top-event 
Table C 5.2: Top event probability with 15 % error in basic events (traditional approach) 
Fuzzy probability 
PA(T) PB(T) Pcm Pnm analysis 
Top event fuzzy set 1.178E-04 2.225E-04 5.262E-04 7.266E-04 (15.0% error) 
Top event fuzzy set 7.537E-05 1.379E-04 3.137E-04 4.274E-04 ( -15.0% error) 
Most likely top event 2.985E-04 
Exact top event 2.892E-04 probability 
Percentage of error on top-
-3.22% (approximately) 
event 
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